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From its inception veil-piercing has been a scourge on corporate law.  
Exactly when the veil of limited liability can and will be circumvented to reach 
into a shareholder’s own assets has befuddled courts, litigants, and scholars 
alike.  And the doctrine has been bedeviled by empirical evidence of a chasm 
between the theory and practice of veil-piercing; notably, veil-piercing claims 
inexplicably seem to prevail more often in Contract than Tort, a finding that 
flouts the engrained distinction between voluntary and involuntary creditors. 
With a dataset of 2,908 cases from 1658 to 2006, this study presents the 
most comprehensive portrait of veil-piercing decisions yet.  Unlike predecessors, 
this study examines Fraud, a long-suspected accessory to veil-piercing, as well 
as specific subclaims in Contract, Tort, and Fraud, to provide a fine-grained 
portrait of voluntary and involuntary creditors.  And this study analyzes the ra-
tionales instrumental to a piercing decision. 
The findings largely comport with our legal intuitions.  The most successful 
civil veil-piercing claims lie in Fraud or involve specific evidence of fraud or 
misrepresentation.  Further, claims not only prevail more often in Tort than 
Contract, but they also adhere to the voluntary–involuntary creditor distinction.  
Surprisingly, though, veil-piercing presents a greater risk to individual 
shareholders than corporate groups. 
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Introduction 
The origins of corporate veil-piercing are unknown.1  This is perhaps 
because the limitation on shareholder liability has never been absolute.2  For 
as long as limited liability has existed, courts have disregarded the form of 
malfeasant corporate entities to access a shareholder’s own assets.3  With 
characteristic flair, I. Maurice Wormser once declared that “[t]he refusal of 
the courts to allow quiddits and quillets to stand in the way of justice is no-
where better exemplified” than by veil-piercing, “Our Lady of the Common 
Law.”4 
Unfortunately, in this venue, Lady Justice measures with metaphors.  At 
the turn of the twentieth century, courts began borrowing from agency law 
the imagery of a corporate “alter ego”5 and “instrumentality”6 to adjudicate 
veil-piercing claims.  The migration, and subsequent mutation,7 of such 
 
1. See, e.g., STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1:3, at 1-12 (2004) 
(“There is some authority . . . for suggesting that the doctrine that shareholders of corporations were 
not normally responsible for the corporation’s debts found its way into American common law 
immediately after the Revolution.  The precise reach of corporate shareholder limited liability in the 
early United States is, however, uncertain.”). 
2. The genesis of American limited liability, like its flip side, is subject to interpretive debate.  
See, e.g., EDWIN MERRICK DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860, at 84–93 
(1954) (suggesting that support for the idea of imposing unlimited liability on shareholders in 
certain situations existed as early as the 1830s in England and America); Phillip I. Blumberg, 
Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573, 587–95 (1986) (contending that 
“acceptance was far from inevitable” for the idea of limiting liability of shareholders, which thus 
was not perceived always as an essential principle of American corporate law); Roger E. Meiners et 
al., Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 351, 362 (1979) (arguing that the 
advent of limited liability did not impact immediately the number of incorporations).  But see 
PRESSER, supra note 1, § 1:3, at 1-17 (arguing that Blumberg’s interpretation of Dodd “is flawed, 
insofar as it minimizes the effects of limited liability on the historical development of American 
industry”). 
3. In the United States, “the cradle of piercing of the corporate veil doctrines,” KAREN 
VANDEKERCKHOVE, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 76 (2007), the earliest general shareholder 
liability statute preceded the earliest judicial reference to veil-piercing by a mere twelve days.  
Compare Act of Mar. 3, 1809, ch. 65, § 6, 1809 Mass. Acts 464, 466 (requiring officers of 
manufacturing corporations to pay judgments against their corporation when the corporation lacks 
sufficient property to pay the judgment), with Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 
75 (1809) (referring to a saying that “you may raise the veil which the corporate name interposes” 
in an opinion dated March 15, 1809). 
4. I. MAURICE WORMSER, DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED 
CORPORATION PROBLEMS 40, 44 (1927). 
5. See, e.g., United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 253 (E.D. Wis. 
1905) (describing a firm as the “alter ego” of a “dummy” corporation); Cheeney v. Ocean S.S. Co., 
19 S.E. 33, 35 (Ga. 1893) (describing an agent as an “alter ego”). 
6. HARRY G. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISES § 146, at 250 n.2 (2d ed. 1970). 
7. Litigants seeking to pierce the veil have had to establish that a corporate defendant was, inter 
alia, a(n) “adjunct,” “agent,” “alias,” “alter ego,” “alter idem,” “arm,” “blind,” “branch,” “buffer,” 
“cloak,” “coat,” “cover,” “creature,” “curious reminiscence,” “delusion,” “department,” “double,” 
“dry shell,” “dummy,” “fiction,” “form,” “instrumentality,” “mouthpiece,” “name,” “nominal 
identity,” “phrase,” “puppet,” “screen,” “sham,” “simulacrum,” “snare,” “stooge,” “subterfuge,” 
“tool,” id., “conduit,” Edwards Co. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., 700 F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir. 1983), 
84 Texas Law Review [Vol. 89:81 
 
 
imagery eventually prompted Justice Cardozo to issue his now famous 
functionalist caution that “[m]etaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for 
starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it.”8 
Cardozo’s fear has proven to be prophetic.  To beat the metaphorical 
veil of limited liability, courts slavishly continue to demand metaphorical 
proof.9  The most common veil-piercing test requires a plaintiff to demon-
strate that a corporation was an “alter ego” or “mere instrumentality,” as 
evidenced by complete control and domination, of a shareholder used to per-
petuate a fraud, wrong, or injustice that has proximately caused unjust loss or 
injury to the plaintiff.10  Quite aptly, veil-piercing has been called 
“jurisprudence by metaphor or epithet.”11 
The inherent imprecision in metaphors has resulted in a doctrinal mess.  
Courts have resorted to compiling ever-expanding lists of ex post fact-
specific factors, no one of which is dispositive or necessarily connected to 
the underlying harm.12  And these factors have inflicted damage in collateral 
contexts.  Veil-piercing tests have been assimilated to unincorporated busi-
ness entities, such as the limited liability company (LLC) and limited liability 
partnership (LLP).13  Veil-piercing tests also have been transmitted to 
 
“curtain,” Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 1991), “device,” Morris v. N.Y. 
State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 623 N.E.2d 1157, 1161 (N.Y. 1993), “marionette,” InSITE Servs. 
Corp. v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (In re InSITE Servs. Corp.), 287 B.R. 79, 97 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002), 
“monkey’s paw,” People v. Clauson, 41 Cal. Rptr. 691, 694 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), 
“paraphernalia,” Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 
1929), “shell,” Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 806, 814 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1962), or “umbilication,” Berger v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 453 F.2d 991, 996 (5th Cir. 
1972), of a controlling shareholder. 
8. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).  Ironically, Cardozo’s eloquence 
obscured, if not undermined, his own attempt to analyze and fix the doctrine.  See PRESSER, supra 
note 1, § 1:4, at 1-21, 1-24 (“Shrouding his own analysis irretrievably in the mists of metaphor,” 
Cardozo’s “ringing phrases, when analyzed, yield little of substance”); infra note 204 and 
accompanying text; cf. FAST TIMES AT RIDGEMONT HIGH (Refugee Films 1982) (“Relax, all right?  
My old man[’s] . . . got this ultimate set of tools.  I can fix it.” (Jeff Spicoli, played by Sean Penn)). 
9. Cf. Fred S. McChesney, Contractarianism Without Contracts?  Yet Another Critique of 
Eisenberg, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1332, 1336 (1990) (“[I]t takes a model to beat a model.” (citing 
GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 7 (4th ed. 1987))). 
10. See, e.g., FREDERICK J. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS: LIABILITY OF 
A PARENT CORPORATION FOR THE OBLIGATIONS OF ITS SUBSIDIARY § 3 (1931) (denoting a three-
element test for piercing the corporate veil).  Another approach has been to cull from Powell a 
checklist of factors.  See, e.g., PRESSER, supra note 1, § 1:6, at 1-30 to 1-34 (detailing a list of 
questions taken from Powell’s work to ask to determine whether to pierce the corporate veil); infra 
note 12 and accompanying text. 
11. PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN THE 
LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 1.02, at 8 (1983). 
12. See, e.g., Associated Vendors, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 813–15 (listing twenty factors); Cathy S. 
Krendl & James R. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry, 55 DENV. L.J. 1, 52–
55 (1978) (listing thirty-one factors, none of which is necessarily “a logical or preferable measure” 
for veil-piercing). 
13. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, The Limits of Liability in the New Limited Liability Entities, 
32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 7 (1997) (“[W]e can expect a regular flow of cases seeking to pierce 
the veil of these new limited liability entities addressed to closely held businesses.”). 
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extracorporate areas of the law, including agriculture, antitrust, arbitration, 
bankruptcy, civil procedure, criminal, discrimination, employment, 
environmental, estate and trust, family, pension, tax, and workers’ 
compensation.14  Not surprisingly, veil-piercing has been decried as an 
“intellectually disturbing”15 and “incoherent”16 doctrine whose “ambiguity 
and randomness”17 resembles “lightning, [in that] it is rare, severe, and 
unprincipled.”18  There even has been a coincidental chorus to eliminate the 
doctrine altogether.19 
Moreover, our understanding of veil-piercing has been complicated by 
empirical analysis.  Almost two decades ago, Robert Thompson conducted a 
pioneering content analysis of approximately 1,600 federal and state veil-
piercing cases.20  Despite the oft-expressed judicial presumption respecting 
 
14. See infra notes 123–32 and accompanying text.  For an example of veil-piercing tests being 
transmitted to criminal law as well as estate and trust law, see Ex parte Chambers, 898 S.W.2d 257, 
260 (Tex. 1995) (holding that a corporate officer or director can be guilty of criminal contempt even 
though a court’s order is directed solely at the corporation and not the officer or director), and 
Henry I. Siegel Co. v. Holliday, 663 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Tex. 1984) (analogizing the role of a board 
of directors to the role of trustees when directors transfer property of the corporation to directors of 
the corporation). 
15. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 38 (1986). 
16. David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the Limits of 
Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1381 (2007). 
17. Allied Capital Corp. v. GC-Sun Holdings, 910 A.2d 1020, 1042 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
18. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 89, 89 (1985). 
19. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479 (2001); 
Douglas C. Michael, To Know a Veil, 26 J. CORP. L. 41 (2000) (both advocating the elimination of 
the veil-piercing doctrine).  Less radical are numerous proposals to codify the veil-piercing test.  
See, e.g., Rebecca J. Huss, Revamping Veil Piercing for All Limited Liability Entities: Forcing the 
Common Law Doctrine into the Statutory Age, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 96 (2001) (urging 
codification to “accomplish[] the goals of veil piercing in a more consistent manner”); John H. 
Matheson & Raymond B. Eby, The Doctrine of Piercing the Veil in an Era of Multiple Limited 
Liability Entities: An Opportunity to Codify the Test for Waiving Owners’ Limited-Liability 
Protection, 75 WASH. L. REV. 147, 152 (2000) (stressing the necessity of “eliminating free-form 
decisionmaking” in favor of codification).  A century ago, though, Wormser dismissed such 
codification efforts as “not only impossible but preposterous.”  WORMSER, supra note 4, at 37–38. 
  Nevertheless, there have been some legislative attempts to control veil-piercing.  See, e.g., 
CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(e) (West 2009) (“The failure of a close corporation to observe corporate 
formalities relating to meetings of directors or shareholders in connection with the management of 
its affairs . . . shall not be considered a factor tending to establish that the shareholders have 
personal liability for corporate obligations.”); WIS. STAT. § 180.1835 (2009) (“The failure of a 
statutory close corporation to observe usual corporate formalities or requirements relating to the 
exercise of its corporate powers or the management of its business and affairs is not grounds for 
imposing personal liability on the shareholders for obligations of the corporation.”); infra note 35 
and accompanying text.  The Model Business Corporation Act, for instance, provides that “a 
shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except 
that he may become personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct.”  MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT § 6.22(b) (2002); see also id. § 7.32(f) (providing that a shareholder agreement “shall not be a 
ground for imposing personal liability on any shareholder . . . even if the agreement or its 
performance . . . results in failure to observe . . . corporate formalities”). 
20. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1036, 1044 (1991) [hereinafter Thompson, Empirical Piercing]; see also Robert B. 
86 Texas Law Review [Vol. 89:81 
 
 
the separation between a corporation and its shareholders,21 Thompson found 
that veil-piercing claims succeeded 40.18% of the time, and exclusively 
against close corporations.22  Further, not only did veil-piercing occur far less 
often against corporate parents than individual shareholders,23 but success 
was not highly correlated with evidence of shareholder domination, a failure 
to observe corporate formalities—such as conducting meetings or keeping 
records—or inadequate capitalization.24  Most notably, Thompson found that 
veil-piercing claims arose and prevailed more often in Contract than Tort.25 
These results project a broad chasm between the theory and practice of 
veil-piercing.  That litigants apparently enjoy far more success against indi-
vidual shareholders belies a diverse collection of arguments and predictions 
about veil-piercing being more compelling against corporate groups.26  Simi-
larly confounding is the apparently weak relationship between a decision to 
pierce and evidence of domination or a failure to observe formalities,27 as 
well as inadequate capitalization, particularly for claims in Tort.28 
But it is the asymmetrical result between Contract and Tort that has 
become one of corporate law’s most notorious, counterintuitive puzzles.  For 
almost as long as veil-piercing has existed, commentators have distinguished 
 
Thompson, Piercing the Veil Within Corporate Groups: Corporate Shareholders as Mere Investors, 
13 CONN. J. INT’L L. 379, 380 & n.4 (1999) [hereinafter Thompson, Group Piercing] (providing a 
limited update on ten additional years of cases). 
21. See, e.g., Kashfi v. Phibro-Salomon, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 727, 732–33 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) 
(“Courts are reluctant to disregard the separate existence of related corporations by piercing the 
corporate veil, and have consistently given substantial weight to the ‘presumption of separateness.’” 
(citations omitted)); EnduraCare Therapy Mgmt. v. Drake, 681 S.E.2d 168, 171 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) 
(maintaining the presumption of separation in the absence of sufficient allegations within the 
complaint). 
22. Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1047–48 & tbl.1. 
23. Id. at 1056. 
24. Id. at 1063 tbl.11. 
25. Id. at 1058.  Substantive claims have been capitalized to distinguish them from factors 
within the veil-piercing test. 
26. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 110–11 (“Courts’ greater willingness to 
allow creditors to reach the assets of corporate as opposed to personal shareholders is . . . consistent 
with economic principles.”); Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and 
Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 589, 623 (1975) (“[C]ourts may have a greater 
proclivity to reach corporate, as opposed to individual, stockholders.”); infra notes 168–69, 172–73 
and accompanying text. 
27. See, e.g., David H. Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 371, 
377–78 (1981) (“Courts nearly always cite disregard of corporate formalities as one prong of the 
test used to determine when the veil should be pierced. . . .  The intent behind the formalities prong 
of the piercing test . . . is to prevent shareholder-owners from impairing the interests of other parties 
by carrying this unity of interest too far.”). 
28. See, e.g., William P. Hackney & Tracey G. Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate 
Capital, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 837, 867 (1982) (“The courts seem more inclined to hold shareholders 
liable for the torts of their corporations than for their contracts when . . . inadequate capitalization is 
present, and the textwriters generally support this position.”); infra notes 101–06 and accompanying 
text. 
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between claims grounded in Contract versus Tort.29  That distinction is com-
monly recast as one between voluntary and involuntary creditors, but the 
fulcrum remains constant: “Contract creditors . . . are compensated ex ante 
for the increased risk of default ex post.  Tort creditors, by contrast, are not 
compensated.”30  The inability of involuntary creditors to bargain or insure 
themselves against risk has led “almost every commentator” to conclude that 
veil-piercing is more compelling in Tort than Contract.31 
Indeed, prior to Thompson’s study, there had been numerous 
observations to this effect.  Commentators believed veil-piercing claims were 
being adjudicated correctly, citing impressionistic evidence that courts were 
generally “more likely to disregard the corporate entity in [T]ort cases than in 
[C]ontract cases.”32  This claim, in turn, started to permeate actual judicial 
reasoning.33  And after a controversial decision by its supreme court,34 Texas 
even amended its business-corporation statute with a stiffer standard for veil-
piercing claims couched in Contract.35 
All of this was thrown into a lurch by Thompson’s findings.  According 
to Thompson, the infrequency of claims in Tort “suggests that piercing law is 
rooted in concerns of inequitable bargains.”36  But even he is pressed to ex-
plain the disparity in veil-piercing rates, merely observing that “[T]ort 
settings seem to involve different concerns than [C]ontracts cases,” or that 
some exogenous factors may be at work.37  As he simply acknowledged, the 
 
29. See, e.g., William O. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through 
Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193, 195 (1929) (bifurcating their analysis of veil-piercing 
cases into claims in Contract versus Tort). 
30. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 112. 
31. See 2 PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG ET AL., BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS § 57.04, at 57-8 
(2d ed. 2010) (“[V]ery special pressures in [T]ort law require a treatment different from that in 
[veil-piercing] cases arising in other areas of law, such as [C]ontract.”); David W. Leebron, Limited 
Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1601 (1991) (“[A]lmost every 
commentator has paused to note that limited liability cannot be satisfactorily justified for [T]ort 
victims . . . .”); infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
32. 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 41.85, at 269–70 (rev. vol. 2006); see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, 
at 112 (“Courts are more willing to disregard the corporate veil in [T]ort than in [C]ontract cases.”). 
33. See, e.g., Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1577 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(“[T]he analysis of corporate veil issues is different in a consensual transaction, such as a breach of 
contract case, than in a nonconsensual transaction, such as many tort cases . . . .”); Gray v. 
Edgewater Landing, 541 So. 2d 1044, 1046 (Miss. 1989) (“Since [C]ontract liability arises from an 
essentially consensual relationship, courts generally decline to disregard the corporate entity . . . .”). 
34. See Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tex. 1986) (permitting veil-piercing 
merely upon proof of constructive fraud). 
35. See Willis v. Donnelly, 199 S.W.3d 262, 272 n.12 (Tex. 2006) (“In response to Castleberry, 
Article 2.21 of the [Texas Business Corporation Act] was amended in 1989 to establish a clear 
legislative standard . . . [for] the liability of a shareholder . . . in the context of contractual 
obligations . . . .” (citing TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.21 cmt. (West 2003))). 
36. Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1068. 
37. Id. at 1069; see also infra notes 143–51 and accompanying text. 
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inexplicable results, “more than any other in the project, go against the con-
ventional wisdom.”38 
That was almost two decades ago.  The results now “appear to be on 
their way to becoming the conventional wisdom.”39  Despite Thompson’s 
caution,40 courts cite his study in adjudicating veil-piercing claims.41  States 
utilize his results to attract potential incorporators,42 and lawyers rely on his 
findings in providing business guidance.43  Further, his methodology has 
been replicated in empirical studies of veil-piercing around the world.44  The 
incontrovertible fact is that Thompson’s study has influenced how we per-
ceive and engage the doctrine. 
Yet to this day, no one has explained the dominance of veil-piercing in 
Contract over Tort.  Some interpret Thompson’s findings as evidence of a 
predisposition toward using Contract as a substantive vehicle for veil-
piercing.45  Others regard the findings as “simply illustrat[ing] how badly the 
courts have been handling piercing cases,”46 and thus “yet another black 
mark against” the doctrine.47  And one commentator even “cling[s] to the 
economists’ notion that the veil is more likely to be pierced in [T]ort than in 
[C]ontract cases.”48  With veil-piercing, people seem to see what they want to 
see. 
 
38. Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1058. 
39. PRESSER, supra note 1, § 1:7, at 1-36 n.5; see also infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
40. See Thompson, Group Piercing, supra note 20, at 392 (“I would discourage devoting too 
much attention to whether corporate law conflicts with [T]ort law . . . .”).  But see infra notes 89–92 
and accompanying text. 
41. See, e.g., Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716, 724 (2004); Theberge v. 
Darbro, Inc., 684 A.2d 1298, 1303 (Me. 1996); Garcia v. Coffman, 946 P.2d 216, 227 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1997) (all referencing Thompson’s veil-piercing study). 
42. See, e.g., Nevada v. California, CORPORATE SERV. CTR., http://corporateservicecenter.com/ 
nevada-california-comparison.html (claiming that “Nevada provides a much stronger corporate 
veil” by citing Thompson’s finding that, “among the states with the largest number of reported veil 
piercing decisions, California courts pierce the corporate veil at the highest rate—45% of attempted 
veil piercing cases in California are successful”). 
43. See, e.g., John Wootton, Corporation Owner’s Survival Guide, EMPOWEREDWEALTH.COM 
1, http://www.empoweredwealth.com/documents/WoottonSurvivalGuideReport_000.pdf (“What’s 
more, over 50 percent of the time, you will lose your protection and the court will hold you 
personally liable.” (citing Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1055)).  Contra 
Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1054–55 & tbl.7 (noting that “[a]mong close 
corporations, those with only one shareholder were pierced in almost 50% of the cases” and 
reporting a 49.64% veil-piercing rate in that specific context). 
44. See infra note 74 and accompanying text. 
45. See, e.g., Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Contract-Centered Veil Piercing, 13 STAN. J.L. 
BUS. & FIN. 121, 127 (2007) (“[C]ourts and litigants demonstrate a bias in favor of piercing in 
[C]ontract disputes compared to [T]ort disputes.  In part, this bias is evidenced in the research of 
Professor Robert Thompson . . . .”); infra note 73. 
46. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Piercing Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion 
Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 76 OR. L. REV. 853, 859 (1997). 
47. Bainbridge, supra note 19, at 512 n.159. 
48. PRESSER, supra note 1, § 1:7, at 1-37 n.5. 
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Or perhaps what they see is simply incomplete.  The controversy about 
the empirics of veil-piercing, particularly in Contract and Tort, may be akin 
to the classic fable about the disagreement among a group of blind men over 
their perception of an elephant.49  In this case the elephant in the room is not 
veil-piercing but its long-suspected accessory: Fraud.  The omission of this 
claim from Thompson’s study, as well as its progeny, is crucial in light of 
Fraud’s substantively hybrid nature;50 certain species of Fraud, for instance, 
can be characterized as a Contract or Tort, or have been regarded by some as 
a complete substitute for Contract claims.51  But there has been no investiga-
tion into, much less speculation about, whether seepage of Fraud into 
Contract or Tort could explain the wayward path apparently being taken by 
courts. 
The present study charts a different course.  An entirely new dataset is 
constructed from 1658 up to and including 2006, thus adding twenty-one 
years to the time frame originally examined by Thompson.52  This dataset is 
not only bigger, but broader, as more expansive search terms were used in 
Westlaw, whose database coverage has become more complete in the two 
decades since Thompson’s study was published.53  The initial yield of 15,188 
cases approximately doubles the number that Thompson’s terms would have 
obtained over the same time frame;54 after exclusions are applied, the final 
dataset of 2,908 federal and state cases presents the most comprehensive em-
pirical portrait of veil-piercing decisions yet.55  Moreover, the present study 
substantially revises and refines Thompson’s methodology.  For the first time 
the dynamics of veil-piercing in Fraud are revealed,56 and data were collected 
for specific subclaims in Contract, Tort, and Fraud to provide not only a fine-
grained portrait of different types of actions, but also insight into the distinc-
tion between voluntary and involuntary creditors.  And the rationes 
decidendi of veil-piercing cases are examined to discern how veil-piercing 
claims are being adjudicated. 
The results largely confirm our legal intuitions about veil-piercing.  
Federal and state courts pierce almost 50% of the time and only the veil of 
close corporations whose potential for consolidated shareholding permits a 
 
49. See generally MASNAVĪ I MA’NAVĪ, TEACHINGS OF RUMI 122–26 (E.H. Whinfield trans., 
Octagon Press 1994) (“The eye of outward sense is as the palm of a hand,/The whole of the object is 
not grasped in the palm.”); JOHN GODFREY SAXE, POEMS 259–61 (1868) (“And so these men of 
Indostan/Disputed loud and long,/Each in his own opinion/Exceeding stiff and strong,/Though each 
was partly in the right/And all were in the wrong!”). 
50. See infra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
51. See infra notes 81, 87 and accompanying text. 
52. This is not an arbitrary time frame.  See infra notes 111, 113 and accompanying text. 
53. See infra note 143. 
54. See infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
55. See infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
56. See supra text accompanying notes 49–51; infra text accompanying notes 80–100. 
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requisite finding of control or domination.57  As expected, the most success-
ful civil veil-piercing claims are grounded in Fraud or supported by specific 
evidence of fraud or misrepresentation.  Moreover, veil-piercing claims pre-
vail more often in Tort than Contract, reversing the counterintuitive 
asymmetry found by Thompson’s study; the superiority of veil-piercing rates 
in Tort over Contract not only holds but expands when those claims are re-
cast into claims between involuntary and voluntary creditors.  Although not 
as sharp as expected, the disparity in rates for these distinctions squares with 
what commentators, courts, and practitioners have long believed but thus far 
been unable to prove.58  Similarly, quite predictable suspects comprise the 
most common instrumental rationales: commingling, control or domination, 
injustice or unfairness, fraud or misrepresentation, and inadequate 
capitalization.  Somewhat surprisingly, though, evidence of inadequate 
capitalization is comparably frequent and instrumental in Contract, Tort, and 
Fraud claims; quite unexpectedly, the relative sophistication of bargaining 
parties yields no appreciable difference in veil-piercing success, while courts 
reach more often into the assets of individual shareholders than corporate 
groups. 
Part I reviews Thompson’s methodology before delineating the 
hypotheses and methodology of the present study.  Part II then systematically 
presents the study’s results from the perspective of the types of courts, the 
state law applied, the types of substantive claims, and the rationales instru-
mental to a decision whether to pierce; Part II concludes by reexamining all 
of these results in terms of voluntary and involuntary creditors. 
I. Methodology 
Veil-piercing is misdubbed the most litigated issue in corporate law.59  
But as the primary exception to limited liability, the doctrine is a staple of 
 
57. See infra note 165 and accompanying text. 
58. See infra notes 88–92. 
59. Contra Robert B. Thompson, Agency Law and Asset Partitioning, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1321, 
1325 (2003); Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1036; Thompson, supra note 13, at 
1; Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil: Is the Common Law the Problem?, 37 CONN. L. REV. 
619, 619 (2005) [hereinafter Thompson, Common Law Piercing] (all describing piercing the veil as 
“the most litigated issue in corporate law”).  This proposition, which is based on searches 
Thompson conducted in Lexis and Westlaw with the same terms used in his study versus terms such 
as “corporate takeover” and “hostile takeover,” has been cited by numerous courts, academics, and 
practitioners.  See, e.g., Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716, 741 (2004) 
(“‘[P]iercing claims constitute the single most litigated area in corporate law . . . .’” (alteration in 
original) (emphasis removed) (quoting FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 1.5, at 70 
(2000))); Darrell D. Dorrell & Gregory A. Gadawski, Counterterrorism: Conventional Tools for 
Unconventional Warfare, U.S. ATT’YS’ BULL., Mar. 2005, at 1, 2, available at http://www.justice. 
gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab5302.pdf; Stephen B. Presser, Commentary, Thwarting the 
Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability, Democracy, and Economics, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 148, 
154 n.21 (1992) (both stating that “‘[p]iercing the corporate veil is the most litigated issue in 
corporate law’” (quoting Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1036)).  Searches using 
Westlaw’s Key Search Topics prior to 1986 and to the present, however, reveal that references to 
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corporate law that impacts virtually every aspect of business planning.60  And 
our empirical knowledge of veil-piercing has been shaped indelibly by 
Robert Thompson’s landmark study, which occupies a prominent place 
within any discussion of the doctrine.  Cited in hundreds of articles, briefs, 
and opinions,61 the study has spawned numerous derivative studies in the 
United States and around the world.62 
However sincere, methodological imitation is not necessarily a form of 
flattery.  Thus far, the critical spotlight has focused almost exclusively on the 
results, and not the methodology, of Thompson’s study.  This Part redirects 
the spotlight, examining that study’s design before proceeding to advance 
some hypotheses and then to delineate the present study’s methodology.  
Part I concludes with some cautionary notes about the limits of both studies. 
A. Thompson’s Methodological Tree 
Thompson’s study actually covers two time frames.  His original dataset 
contained approximately 1,600 veil-piercing cases in Westlaw, up to and in-
cluding 1985;63 Thompson subsequently expanded the dataset with an 
additional 2,200 cases from 1986 up to and including 1996.64  The update 
yielded results consistent with the original findings:65 
1. Courts pierced the corporate veil in approximately 40% of 
all reported cases; 
2. Piercing . . . is a doctrine directed exclusively at close 
corporations and corporate groups . . . ; 
 
numerous claims, including “Liabilities of Officers and Directors” ((TO(101x(c)) (TO(101x(d))) /p 
Liab!) (101k653 /p (officer director))) and “Dissolution” (TO(101x(v))), all yield more hits than 
Thompson’s search terms.  See Scotland M. Duncan, Lifting the Veil of Misconception About the 
Most Litigated Issue in Corporate Law 18 (2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) 
(noting that from 1986 to 2008, Key Search references to veil-piercing increased more than any 
other topic with at least 3,000 hits). 
60. See, e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 59, § 1.5, at 70 (describing veil-piercing as “the area of 
corporation law which the attorney seeking to avoid corporate practice is most likely to confront”); 
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 89 (“Limited liability is a fundamental principle of 
corporate law.”); Leebron, supra note 31, at 1566 (“No principle seems more established in 
capitalist law or more essential to the functioning of the modern corporate economy [than limited 
liability].”); Robert B. Thompson, The Basic Business Associations Course: An Empirical Study of 
Methods and Content, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 438, 440 fig.1 (1998) (reporting veil-piercing as the only 
topic taught by all seventy-one Business Associations/Corporations professors responding to a 
survey). 
61. A search of ((Robert /2 Thompson) /s (“Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study”)) 
in Westlaw’s ALLCASES, BRIEF-ALL, and TP-ALL databases yielded 245 hits. 
62. See infra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. 
63. See infra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
64. See Thompson, Group Piercing, supra note 20, at 385 (“A preliminary examination of the 
recent data indicates that these results fit within the pattern of the original study.”).  But see infra 
text accompanying note 164.  The 2,200 cases apparently comprise the initial yield and not the final 
dataset.  By comparison there were only 802 cases in this study’s final dataset from 1986 up to and 
including 1996. 
65. Thompson, Group Piercing, supra note 20, at 385. 
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3. Courts pierce the veil more often to get to an individual 
who is a shareholder [43.13%, 786 cases] than to reach 
another corporation who is a shareholder [37.21%, 637 
cases] . . . [;] 
4. Courts are less likely to pierce the veil in cases involving 
[T]ort claims [30.97%, 226 cases] as opposed to those 
involving [C]ontractual [41.98%, 779 cases] or [S]tatutory 
claims [40.58%, 552 cases] . . . ; 
5. Undercapitalization [53.22%, 171 cases] and corporate 
informalities [46.46%, 226 cases] often lead to piercing, 
but appear in a relatively small percentage of all cases in 
which courts pierce and an even smaller number of the 
[T]ort cases.66 
Moreover, “even if we eliminate[d] the [M]isrepresentation cases from the 
[C]ontracts group, the piercing results [would] still remain higher in 
[C]ontract cases.”67  According to Thompson, these results suggest that, for 
close corporations, veil-piercing is “strongly rooted in the bargain setting,”68 
and that “courts interfere when there has been wrongful conduct by the pro-
prietor that inappropriately changes the bargain the parties struck.”69 
For both time frames, Thompson utilized the same methodology.70  
Combinations of two search terms, “piercing the corporate veil” and 
“disregard! the corporate entity,” as well as four unidentified Key Numbers 
were run in Westlaw.71  A team of law students then collected data on a 
decision’s year, the court’s jurisdiction and type, the type of plaintiff and 
defendant, the number and type of shareholders, the substantive claims con-
nected to veil-piercing, the frequency with which eighty-five possible 
rationales were mentioned in all cases, and the court’s ultimate decision 
whether to pierce.72 
Thompson’s study has served as the methodological foundation for all 
subsequent empirical studies of corporate disregard.  In the United States, 
pairs of Wake Forest law students have sampled the last twenty years of veil-
piercing cases in Westlaw, and “[b]ecause [their] method was intended to 
mirror Professor Thompson’s, [they] closely followed his methodology.”73  
 
66. Id. at 384–85 (citations omitted).  The bracketed figures come from Thompson, Empirical 
Piercing, supra note 20, at 1055 tbl.7, 1058 tbl.9; see also Thompson, supra note 13, at 9 (“After 
additional analysis of that data base, I can make a broader statement.  Piercing occurs only within 
corporate groups or in close corporations with fewer than ten shareholders.”). 
67. Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1069. 
68. Id. at 1071. 
69. Thompson, Common Law Piercing, supra note 59, at 629. 
70. Compare Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1044–47, with Thompson, 
Group Piercing, supra note 20, at 385–88. 
71. Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1036 n.1. 
72. Id. at 1044 & n.48. 
73. Lee C. Hodge & Andrew B. Sachs, Empirical Study, Piercing the Mist: Bringing the 
Thompson Study into the 1990s, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 347 (2008) (analyzing 228 cases 
2010] Veil-Piercing 93 
 
 
Thompson’s methodology also has been replicated by Australian and British 
studies, both of which incidentally find a similar asymmetry for Contract 
over Tort.74 
Far less prevalent, though, has been any critical reflection on 
Thompson’s methodology.75  His study presents the frequency of and success 
 
from 1986 to 1995); see also Rich McPherson & Nader Raja, Corporate Justice: An Empirical 
Study of Piercing Rates and Factors Courts Consider When Piercing the Corporate Veil 12 (2009) 
(unpublished note) (on file with author) (examining 236 cases from 1996 to 2005).  Both studies 
sampled one-sixth of all cases and found that the overall veil-piercing rate apparently declined.  See 
Hodge & Sachs, supra, at 347, 349–50 (analyzing 483 cases out of 2,901 returned in the initial 
search and “showing an increasing reluctance of courts to pierce the corporate veil”); McPherson & 
Raja, supra, at 12 (analyzing every sixth case arranged chronologically to create a sample of 638 
cases from an initial yield of 3,821 cases).  Notably, Hodge and Sachs’s sample found that veil-
piercing claims prevail more often in Tort (35.71%) than Contract (31.11%).  Hodge & Sachs, 
supra, at 354 tbl.8; see also PRESSER, supra note 1, § 1:7, at 1-37 n.5 (“The review of the cases that 
I did in preparing this treatise for publication in 1991, particularly with regard to cases decided 
since 1985, the end of the Thompson study period, does suggest that the idea that courts ought to 
pierce less frequently in [C]ontract cases is gaining ground.”).  But see infra note 244 and 
accompanying text.  McPherson and Raja’s sample, however, found that veil-piercing claims 
prevail more often in Contract (30.70%) than Tort (15.00%).  McPherson & Raja, supra, at 21 
tbl.10. 
  Another corporate veil-piercing study drawing on Thompson’s methodology is by Nicholas 
Georgakopoulos.  His study simply examines Westlaw Key Number references to veil-piercing in 
Contract and Tort, from 1947 up to and including 2003, to generate a prediction about the frequency 
with which litigants pursue these claims.  Georgakopoulos, supra note 45, at 127–28.  
Georgakopoulos’s study, however, does not involve any coding and, by extension, any veil-piercing 
rates.  Moreover, his study is highly vulnerable to false positives because of the remedial nature of 
veil-piercing and evidence suggesting asymmetrical settlement rates in Tort versus Contract.  See 
infra notes 147, 152 and accompanying text. 
  Thompson’s study also has served as a methodological template for empirical studies 
examining specific applications and arguable extensions of veil-piercing.  See generally John H. 
Matheson, The Modern Law of Corporate Groups: An Empirical Study of Piercing the Corporate 
Veil in the Parent-Subsidiary Context, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1091 (2009) (examining 360 parent–
subsidiary cases from January 1, 1990, to March 1, 2008); Fred S. McChesney, Doctrinal Analysis 
and Statistical Modeling in Law: The Case of Defective Incorporation, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 493 
(1993) (examining 102 defective incorporation cases from 1818 to 1945); Geoffrey Christopher 
Rapp, Preserving LLC Veil Piercing: A Response to Bainbridge, 31 J. CORP. L. 1063 (2006) 
(examining sixty-one LLC veil-piercing cases up to and including 2005).  But see Timothy R. 
Wyatt, Note, The Doctrine of Defective Incorporation and Its Tenuous Coexistence with the Model 
Business Corporation Act, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 833, 847–51 (2009) (criticizing McChesney’s 
conclusion that defective incorporation is a subset of veil-piercing). 
74. See Charles Mitchell, Lifting the Corporate Veil in the English Courts: An Empirical Study, 
3 COMPANY FIN. & INSOLVENCY L. REV. 15, 18 (1999) (examining 290 British cases from 1888 up 
to and including 1998 with a methodology that “was inspired by the example of two similar studies 
which have been undertaken, one of a large group of American cases, the other of a smaller group 
of Australian cases”); Ian M. Ramsay & David B. Noakes, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Australia, 
19 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 250 (2001) (examining 104 Australian cases up to and including 1999).  
But see generally Peter B. Oh, Piercing v. Lifting 1, 8–10 (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author) (examining 188 British cases from 1888 up to and including 2006 with the same 
methodology used here and finding, inter alia, corporate-disregard claims prevail more often in Tort 
than Contract). 
75. Ramsay and Noakes have made one of the few substantive refinements in all subsequent 
empirical veil-piercing studies, which is to code cases for claims on a nonexclusive basis.  See 
Ramsay & Noakes, supra note 74, at 264 (“There are 109 cases listed, more than the overall study, 
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rates for veil-piercing within four substantive claims: Contract, Criminal, 
Statute, and Tort.76  But the total number of claims is less than the total num-
ber of cases, which indicates that none of the cases contained multiple claims 
or that they were reduced subjectively to just one type of claim.77  Similarly, 
the number of defendant shareholders is dramatically less than the total num-
ber of cases, despite the possibility that there may be bundled claims against 
corporate groups and individuals.78  Further, his study presents only the fre-
quency with which a rationale is mentioned in cases and the extent to which 
 
as in some cases the piercing argument was made in more than one context.”).  One criticism of 
Thompson’s study is that the results are not replicable.  See David S. Goldman, Legal Construct 
Validation: Expanding Empirical Legal Scholarship to Unobservable Concepts, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 
79, 123 (2007) (“While [Thompson’s] article precisely describes the specific searches conducted, it 
does not completely explain how the results were filtered.”).  Thompson actually does not specify 
the four Key Numbers used in connection with his search terms, see infra note 114, and he does not 
provide complete results for combinations of variables, such as the veil-piercing rate for claims and 
rationales.  See, e.g., infra note 209 and accompanying text. 
  Another set of criticisms has been advanced by Fred McChesney: 
[T]he rethinking . . . carried forward by Thompson is not wholly satisfactory 
methodologically.  Merely counting cases and sorting them into various pigeonholes 
according to expressed judicial rationales . . . suffers from at least two deficiencies. . . .  
  First, the stated reasons for judges’ holdings may not always explain the complete 
rationale for their decisions. . . . 
  Second, courts typically designate more than one factor as relevant or important in 
the ultimate decision, rather than expound a bright-line, single-factor rule. 
McChesney, supra note 73, at 515.  With respect to the second concern, McChesney’s constructive 
suggestion is to use multiple regression, “a statistical technique that can solve the problems of 
calculating the influence of individual case factors, identifying their relative weights, and 
accounting for the simultaneous presence of different factors.”  Id. at 519; see also id. at 515 n.82 
(“Thompson is aware of the methodological shortcomings of merely sorting cases, and reports that 
he is at work on a multiple regression model for the veil-piercing cases.”).  This suggestion has been 
applied productively by John Matheson’s recent study of veil-piercing in corporate groups, which 
notes that “[a]though Thompson recognized the need for a more sophisticated ‘logit analysis, a form 
of statistical regression analysis,’ the supposed ‘model and the results’ have never been reported.”  
Matheson, supra note 73, at 1106 n.48 (quoting Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 
1046 n.62).  Thompson actually did perform regression analysis but limited it to statistical 
differences and presented it on a selective basis.  Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 
1049 nn.77–79, 1052 nn.83 & 87, 1055 n.100, 1057 nn.111 & 114, 1058 n.116.  Only summary 
statistics are presented here, as regression analysis will be part of a future project.  As for 
McChesney’s concerns about judicial rationales, this study focuses on a case’s rationes decidendi 
rather than their mere mention.  See infra subpart II(D).  Some of his functionalist concerns are 
addressed here, but there are unavoidable selection effects that apply not only to this study, but also 
to Matheson’s and McChesney’s.  See infra notes 143–51 and accompanying text. 
76. Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1044. 
77. Compare Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1058 tbl.9 (reporting 1,572 
Contract, Tort, Criminal, and Statute cases), with id. at 1048 tbl.1 (reporting 1,583 cases), id. at 
1049 tbl.2 (reporting a total of 1,585 cases over time), and id. at 1050 tbl.4 (reporting 1,577 cases 
by court); compare also Thompson, Group Piercing, supra note 20, at 386 tbl.2 (reporting 445 
Contract, Tort, and Statute cases), with id. at 386 tbl.1 (reporting 547 corporate-group cases). 
78. Compare Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1055 tbl.7 (reporting 1,423 
shareholders), with id. at 1048 tbl.1 (reporting 1,583 cases), id. at 1049 tbl.2 (reporting 1,585 cases 
over time), and id. at 1050 tbl.4 (reporting 1,577 cases by court).  Thompson presented results for 
only corporate and individual shareholders, but even the addition of governmental owners seems 
unlikely to account for the difference. 
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the rationale’s absence or presence coincides with decisions to pierce; 
although useful, those data do not reflect whether a particular rationale’s 
absence or presence played a dispositive role in the court’s ultimate 
decision.79  Evidence of control or domination, for instance, may appear with 
equal frequency in Contract and Tort claims, but its absence or presence may 
serve as dicta in certain situations and a dispositive justification in others. 
Moreover, Thompson’s study does not recognize Fraud as a distinct 
substantive claim.  Instead, Fraud claims were recharacterized as Contract, 
Criminal, Statute, or Tort claims on an exclusive basis.80  But the lines for 
recharacterization are not always so clear.  For instance, although Fraudulent 
Misrepresentation claims can be characterized as either Contract or Tort,81 
they frequently receive ambiguous treatment in opinions.82  And courts fre-
quently conflate the distinction between Contract-based warranty and Tort-
based deceit claims.83  The versatility in the characterization of Fraud claims 
presents a potentially distortive effect on Thompson’s findings about the fre-
quency of and rates for veil-piercing in Contract and Tort. 
Thompson’s omission of Fraud is puzzling given its long-suspected role 
as an accessory to veil-piercing.  Stephen Presser, for instance, has observed 
 
79. Id. at 1063 (“[T]he same reasons seem to appear in cases which pierce the veil and those 
decisions which do not.” (citation omitted)).  Although failed and successful attempts to pierce do 
mention the same four rationales with the most frequency, their proportional representation varies 
substantially.  For instance, more than any other rationale, the absence of fraud or misrepresentation 
is mentioned in decisions not to pierce, but its presence is far less prominent in successful veil-
piercing cases.  Compare id. at 1063 tbl.11, with id. at 1064 n.141. 
80. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
81. See, e.g., Thomas C. Galligan Jr., Contortions Along the Boundary Between Contracts and 
Torts, 69 TUL. L. REV. 457, 462–63 (1994) (identifying six considerations for deciding whether to 
characterize a claim in Contract or Tort).  Moreover, as is evident in conflicts of laws, 
characterization can be a difficult problem.  See, e.g., A. H. ROBERTSON, CHARACTERIZATION IN 
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 176–83 (1940) (examining the problem of characterization for Contract 
and Tort). 
82. See, e.g., Moses v. Martin, 360 F. Supp. 2d 533, 543–44 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (denying a 
motion to dismiss a Fraud claim that was allegedly a restatement of a breach-of-contract claim on 
the basis that the defendant owed a fiduciary duty); Ziegler v. Inabata of Am., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 2d 
908, 916–17 (D. Colo. 2004) (denying a motion for summary judgment for claims based on an 
ownership interest, “thereby invoking claims for breach of contract and fraudulent, or at a 
minimum, negligent misrepresentation”). 
83. See, e.g., William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 
MINN. L. REV. 791, 800 (1966) (characterizing warranty as a “freak hybrid born of the illicit 
intercourse of [T]ort and [C]ontract”); Glenn D. West & W. Benton Lewis, Jr., Contracting to Avoid 
Extra-Contractual Liability—Can Your Contractual Deal Ever Really Be the “Entire” Deal?, 64 
BUS. LAW. 999, 1009–10 (2009) (“Even since courts have enforced express warranties as 
contractual promises, many courts have continued to recognize a separate [T]ort claim for breaches 
of those express warranties to the extent that such claims also satisfy the culpability, materiality, 
and reliance requirements of a [M]isrepresentation claim brought in [T]ort.”).  The economic-loss 
doctrine represents a judicial attempt to clarify this distinction.  See, e.g., United Vaccines, Inc. v. 
Diamond Animal Health, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1094 (W.D. Wis. 2006) (“The economic loss 
doctrine is intended to keep a party from effecting an end run around [C]ontract law to recover 
under [T]ort law what it could not recover under [C]ontract law and through [C]ontract remedies.” 
(citation omitted)). 
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that veil-piercing “often incorporates and bears a strong resemblance to 
[F]raud.”84  And Robert Clark has gone so far as to argue that most veil-
piercing claims may be seen as simply Fraudulent Transfers disguised.85  
Even Stephen Bainbridge, who despises veil-piercing, believes that “[F]raud 
and [M]isrepresentation asks the right questions and seems far more likely to 
lead to correct outcomes.”86  In a similar vein, Richard Posner has suggested 
that, “[s]ince [F]raud is independently actionable, one may question the need 
for a doctrine of piercing the corporate veil in [C]ontract cases.”87 
Posner’s skepticism presumes that the orthodox economic distinction 
between voluntary and involuntary creditors is judicially compelling.88  In 
theory limited liability does not present a moral-hazard problem of external-
izing risk to voluntary creditors because they can and will take optimal 
precautions.89  But when the transaction costs of precautions are prohibitively 
high, the probability that a corporation will engage in risk-shifting activity 
increases.90  Imposing Tort liability compensates involuntary creditors while 
also creating incentives for corporations to engage in an efficient amount of 
care.91  This distinction should be obviated only when there is fraudulent 
 
84. PRESSER, supra note 1, § 1:1, at 1-7. 
85. See Robert Charles Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 505, 540–53 (1977) (excepting veil-piercing of corporations with inadequate initial 
capitalization from his assertion). 
86. Bainbridge, supra note 19, at 519. 
87. Torco Oil Co. v. Innovative Thermal Corp., 763 F. Supp. 1445, 1451 (N.D. Ill. 1991) 
(Posner, J., by designation).  But see Krendl & Krendl, supra note 12, at 31 (“Fraud cases are 
difficult to prove, and the quantum of evidence available in most corporate veil cases is 
considerably smaller than would be required to carry the burden on a fraud claim.”). 
88. But see infra note 287 and accompanying text. 
89. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 499, 503 (1976) (contending that lenders will exact higher interest rates on limited liability 
corporations as a risk premium); cf. PRESSER, supra note 1, § 1:7, at 1-37 to 1-38 (“Posner’s veil-
piercing article . . . is simply developing an argument . . . already advanced by [Frederick] 
Powell.”). 
90. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 105 (“This is a simple application of the 
Coase Theorem.”); id. at 104–09 (explaining that some of a firm’s costs for risky activities are 
shifted to involuntary creditors when high transaction costs prevent affected parties from charging 
an appropriate risk premium). 
91. See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder 
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1879–81 (1991) [hereinafter Hansmann & 
Kraakman, Unlimited Liability] (suggesting a rule of pro rata shareholder liability for corporate 
Torts); Leebron, supra note 31, at 1568–69 (arguing that the justifications for limited liability do not 
apply to noncontractual creditors).  Hansmann and Kraakman’s suggestion has been criticized on 
essentially enforcement grounds.  See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder 
Liability Through a Procedural Lens, 106 HARV. L. REV. 387, 388–90 (1992) (contending that 
Hansmann and Kraakman’s proposal would encounter too many procedural barriers and might not 
be implementable); Joseph A. Grundfest, The Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets 
Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387, 389–91 (1992) (criticizing a pro rata rule for shareholder liability 
because it does not account for how capital markets actually would react to that rule).  But see 
generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, A Procedural Focus on Unlimited Shareholder 
Liability, 106 HARV. L. REV. 446 (1992) [hereinafter Hansmann & Kraakman, Procedural Focus] 
(responding to Alexander’s criticisms); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Do the Capital 
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conduct, as it impedes the ability of parties to assess accurately the optimal 
level of precautions.92 
Thompson’s methodology permits only a crude assessment of this 
account’s validity.  His study does provide limited insight into the success of 
veil-piercing claims in Contract and Tort, as well as the frequency with 
which courts mention rationales.93  But a more fine-grained analysis would 
examine the relative sophistication of contracting parties to see whether veil-
piercing truly “is rooted in concerns of inequitable bargains.”94  And one 
would want to examine intentional, negligent, and quasi-contractual Torts to 
see whether “[T]ort settings seem to involve different concerns than 
[C]ontracts cases.”95 
Moreover, one would want to examine the rationales that seem 
instrumental to a court’s ultimate decision whether to pierce.  As Frank 
Gevurtz has pointed out, 
The question is not what sort of creditor more deserves piercing in the 
abstract.  Rather, the question is what specific facts justify piercing in 
favor of either type of creditor.  The utility of the [T]orts versus 
[C]ontracts distinction is that the facts which should justify piercing 
may be different when dealing with the different types of claimants.96 
Although not a prerequisite in most tests, evidence of “fraud or something 
like it” is demanded by Delaware courts97 and is often given significant 
weight in other jurisdictions;98 if veil-piercing indeed concerns inequitable 
bargains, Thompson has suggested that, in those settings, “the role of the 
court will be similar to that in other [C]ontract contexts—has there been 
fraud or some other reason why the bargain struck by the parties should not 
be respected by the court?”99  Alternatively, if fraud or misrepresentation is 
absent or insufficient, evidence of commingled assets or a failure to observe 
 
Markets Compel Limited Liability?  A Response to Professor Grundfest, 102 YALE L.J. 427 (1992) 
[hereinafter Hansmann & Kraakman, Capital Markets] (rebutting Grundfest’s criticisms).  For an 
analysis of the origins of this carve out, see Daniel R. Kahan, Note, Shareholder Liability for 
Corporate Torts: A Historical Perspective, 97 GEO. L.J. 1085, 1102–03 (2009). 
92. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 112 (“Th[e] distinction between 
[C]ontract and [T]ort creditors breaks down when the debtor engages in fraud or 
misrepresentation . . . [because] the creditor will not demand adequate compensation.”). 
93. Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1063 tbl.11, 1068–70. 
94. Id. at 1068. 
95. Id. at 1069. 
96. Gevurtz, supra note 46, at 859. 
97. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Linear Films, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 260, 268 (D. Del. 1989) 
(“Fraud or something like it is required.” (citations omitted)). 
98. See, e.g., Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 806, 813 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1962) (“[W]hile the doctrine does not depend on the presence of actual fraud, it is designed 
to prevent what would be fraud or injustice, if accomplished.”).  Not surprisingly, this requirement 
has mutated.  See, e.g., Kuibyshevnefteorgsynthez v. Model, Civ. A. No. 93-4919, 1995 WL 66371, 
at *15 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 1995) (“‘[I]njustice or the like’ will suffice.” (citation omitted)). 
99. Thompson, Common Law Piercing, supra note 59, at 622. 
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basic corporate formalities might assert itself more when veil-piercing liti-
gants succeed in Contract than in Tort.100 
One other rationale meriting specific attention is undercapitalization.  
For years commentators and courts have debated how such evidence should 
be weighed for veil-piercing cases.  Early commentators argued that 
undercapitalization was a serviceable proxy for fraud or misrepresentation 
that warranted veil-piercing in all contexts,101 and, despite difficulties in 
determining the amount and sufficiency of capital possessed by a defendant 
corporation,102 this evidence seemed to command judicial attention.103  In 
particular, courts focused on the amount of initial capital supplied by an 
incorporator, grounded in the fact that minimum statutory requirements had 
replaced individual legislative scrutiny over when to grant a corporate 
charter.104  But the gradual relaxation of these statutory requirements to a 
nominal, if any, amount over the course of the twentieth century has eroded 
the utility of initial capital for veil-piercing purposes.105  As a result, the fo-
cus has expanded to include whether there was sufficient capital at the time 
of the alleged misconduct or, alternatively, if assets had been siphoned for a 
 
100. See, e.g., Millon, supra note 16, at 1335 (acknowledging that veil-piercing may be 
justified “if shareholders have deliberately ignored corporate formalities to mislead creditors into 
believing they were dealing with the shareholders directly rather than with agents of a 
corporation”). 
101. See, e.g., ELVIN R. LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS § 36, at 128 
(1936) (“[I]n the case of the inadequately financed corporation . . . the creditor [can] be said to rely 
on the capital or financial resources reasonably to be expected of an owner . . . .  The law cannot 
compel business success; it can compel fair dealing.”); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Theory of Enterprise 
Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343, 349 n.15 (1947) (“In all cases insufficient capitalization is 
persuasive evidence that the enterprise was not separate.”).  But see Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Dupuy & 
Dupuy Developers, Inc., 227 So. 2d 265, 269 (La. Ct. App. 1969) (“Inadequate capitalization is not 
of itself a badge of fraud.”). 
102. See, e.g., Radaszewski v. Telecom Corp., 981 F.2d 305, 309–10 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(interpreting “properly capitalized” as including “financial responsibility” on the way to assessing 
the sufficiency of a defendant’s liability insurance); James R. Gillespie, The Thin Corporate Line: 
Loss of Limited Liability Protection, 45 N.D. L. REV. 363, 386–87 (1969) (“Courts are . . . hard 
pressed to indicate what they actually mean by inadequate capitalization in the absence of 
predetermined statutory or legal standards and perhaps the paucity of economic evidence and 
evaluation in the individual cases.”). 
103. See, e.g., Douglas & Shanks, supra note 29, at 214 (“[A]n analysis of the cases seems to 
indicate that the courts are more impressed by an obvious inadequacy of capital on the part of the 
subsidiary than they are by the presence of any of the other indicia of identity between the 
corporations . . . .”); Hackney & Benson, supra note 28, at 859 (“There is no question today but that 
inadequate capital is considered by all courts to be one of the most important factors in cases 
imposing liability on shareholders for corporate obligations.”). 
104. See, e.g., Hackney & Benson, supra note 28, at 851–52 (describing how state legislatures 
shifted from granting corporate charters by scrutinizing individual operational plans to “adopt[ing] 
general conditions to be met by all who sought to incorporate, including minimum capitalization 
requirements”). 
105. See, e.g., Millon, supra note 16, at 1337 (“[T]aken by itself initial capitalization should be 
of limited relevance to the question of shareholder liability for corporate obligations.  Corporation 
statutes no longer include requirements for minimal initial capitalization or ongoing levels of 
capital.”). 
2010] Veil-Piercing 99 
 
 
shareholder’s own use.106  Whatever the relevant time, the sufficiency of 
capital would seem to bear more directly on the moral-hazard problem and 
thus have more relevance in Tort.107 
Thompson’s study seems to suggest otherwise.  Undercapitalization 
appears in only a small fraction of veil-piercing cases in Tort (as well as 
Contract), and its mention is correlated with a modest overall veil-piercing 
rate of 53.22%.108  According to Thompson, these findings paint 
undercapitalization’s role in Tort as “an issue that appeals to commentators 
for reasons other than its predictive significance.”109  Merely examining the 
frequency of a rationale’s mention in cases, however, tells only part of the 
story.  Undercapitalization may not appear often with Tort, but it may nev-
ertheless play a disproportionately more instrumental role in an ultimate 
decision to pierce there than with Contract.  Without such data, the predictive 
value of this or any other rationale seems unclear, at best. 
B. A New Methodological Leaf 
This study examines veil-piercing cases in Westlaw from 1658 up to 
and including 2006.110  Combinations of two search phrases, “pierc! /s veil” 
and “disregard! /s (entity entities),” were run in two comprehensive Westlaw 
databases whose coverages both begin in 1658.111  The same searches also 
 
106. See, e.g., Pierson v. Jones, 625 P.2d 1085, 1089 n.1 (Idaho 1981) (Bistline, J., dissenting) 
(“As to the issue of undercapitalization, the issue is not whether the corporation was initially 
undercapitalized, but whether [the defendant] drained the corporate assets for his own use.”).  But 
see, e.g., Secon Serv. Sys., Inc. v. St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co., 855 F.2d 406, 416 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(“A requirement to provide continuing capitalization, as [plaintiff] urges, probably would injure 
noncontrolling creditors, rather than helping them, by precipitating unnecessary forced sales.”); 
Douglas G. Smith, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Regulated Industries, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1165, 
1174 (“[G]enerally one must look to the capitalization of the corporation when it is formed—not 
during subsequent periods of operation.”). 
107. See, e.g., Robert E. Dye, Note, Inadequate Capitalization as a Basis for Shareholder 
Liability: The California Approach and a Recommendation, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 823, 836 (1972) 
(“The case for inadequate capitalization as a basis for shareholder liability is perhaps strongest 
where the corporate creditor is a [T]ort victim with an unpaid judgment.”).  But see Hackney & 
Benson, supra note 28, at 869 (“It should, however, be noted that in almost every [T]ort 
case . . . where undercapitalization was stressed in the denial of limited liability, the court has found 
additional factors constituting misuse of the corporate form . . . .”). 
108. But see Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1066 n.149 (reporting 
undercapitalization present in 12 Torts cases with a 75.00% veil-piercing rate versus 87 Contracts 
cases with a 70.11% veil-piercing rate); id. at 1063 tbl.11 (reporting a total of 120 cases with a 
73.33% veil-piercing rate). 
109. Id. at 1067. 
110. Cf. Brian N. Lizotte, Publish or Perish: The Electronic Availability of Summary 
Judgments by Eight District Courts, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 107, 134 (examining summary judgment 
cases and finding that “Lexis and Westlaw were highly consistent in the cases they reported” and 
“[t]he agreement between the services was statistically strong”). 
111. Scope of ALLCASES, WESTLAW, http://web2.westlaw.com/scope/default.aspx?db= 
ALLCASES&RP=/scope/default.wl&RS=WLW10.08&VR=2.0&SV=Split&FN=_top&MT=208&
MST=; Scope of ALLCASES-OLD, WESTLAW, http://web2.westlaw.com/scope/default.aspx?db= 
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were performed in specialized Westlaw databases and then cross-checked to 
ensure the dataset’s completeness.112  The dataset terminates at 2006 to 
determine whether veil-piercing rates vary in “published” versus 
“unpublished” dispositions, a distinction within federal courts that was im-
plemented around 1973 and effectively terminated as of January 1, 2007.113 
The searches yielded an initial dataset of 15,188 cases.114  I discarded 
cases without any relevant or meaningful reference to veil-piercing and then 
coded the remaining dataset of 11,546 cases.  I collected data for a decision’s 
year, publication status, and precedential value; the court’s jurisdiction and 
type; the source of the law applied; the type of defendant and shareholder; all 
of the substantive claims connected to veil-piercing; and all of the rationales 
that appeared instrumental to the court’s decision whether to pierce. 
Five groups of cases then were set aside.  The first group comprises 
cases against only an unincorporated business entity, such as an LLC or 
LLP.115  The second group comprises direct liability,116 director or officer 
 
ALLCASES-OLD&RP=/scope/default.wl&RS=WLW10.08&VR=2.0&SV=Split&FN=_top& 
MT=208&MST=. 
112. The specialized databases are ALLFEDS, SCT, CTA, DCT, DCT-OLD, ALLSTATES, 
and ALLSTATES-OLD. 
113. See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 (permitting citations of all decisions “designated as 
‘unpublished,’ ‘not for publication,’ ‘non-precedential,’ ‘not precedent,’ or the like”); David R. 
Cleveland, Overturning the Last Stone: The Final Step in Returning Precedential Status to All 
Opinions, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 61, 85, 94 (2009) (discussing the history of the precedential 
value of unpublished decisions).  Numerous states, however, continue to permit unpublished or 
nonprecedential decisions.  See Shenoa L. Payne, The Ethical Conundrums of Unpublished 
Opinions, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 723, 754 (2008) (“[S]tate courts are still free to promulgate 
their own rules of court regarding unpublished state court decisions.”). 
114. The broader search terms yield almost twice as many cases as Thompson would have 
collected over his initial time frame.  By comparison, Thompson’s search terms would have yielded 
7,148 cases over the same time frame.  Thompson also used four unidentified Westlaw Key 
Numbers, Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1036 n.1, but searches using the four 
most likely candidates (101k1.4!, 101k1.5!, 101k1.6!, 101k1.7!) yield only an additional 1,379 
cases, for a total just over half the amount obtained here. 
115. E.g., Faulkner v. Kornman (In re The Heritage Org.), 413 B.R. 438, 514 n.64 (Bankr. N.D. 
Tex. 2009) (“It is unclear if the alter ego theory applies to limited partnerships in Delaware.”); 
Pinebrook Props., Ltd. v. Brookhaven Lake Prop. Owners Ass’n, 77 S.W.3d 487, 499 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2002, pet. denied) (“The theory of alter ego, or piercing the corporate veil, is 
inapplicable to partnerships.”).  Courts in most jurisdictions, in agreement with most commentators, 
permit veil-piercing of LLCs.  See, e.g., Ditty v. CheckRite, Ltd., 973 F. Supp. 1320, 1335 (D. Utah 
1997) (“While there is little case law discussing veil piercing theories outside the corporate context, 
most commentators assume that the doctrine applies to limited liability companies.”).  But a number 
of relevant substantive differences between LLCs and corporations militate against unified analysis.  
See, e.g., Hollowell v. Orleans Reg’l Hosp., No. Civ.A. 95-4029, 1998 WL 283298, at *9 (E.D. La. 
May 29, 1998).  In Hollowell, the court noted, 
Professor Kalinka cautions that the analyses between corporate veil piercing and 
limited liability company veil piercing may not completely overlap, noting that 
“[b]ecause the Louisiana LLC law requires fewer formalities such as annual elections 
of directors, keeping minutes, or holding meetings, failure to follow these formalities 
should not serve as grounds for piercing the veil of an LLC.” 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 9 SUSAN KALINKA, LOUISIANA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 
AND PARTNERSHIPS § 1.32, at 64 (1997)); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC Veil 
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participation,117 or successor liability cases,118 all of which are often con-
flated with veil-piercing.119  The third group comprises cases involving 
reverse-piercing or triangular-piercing, both of which are substantively dis-
tinct from orthodox veil-piercing.120  The fourth group comprises cases that 
were decided subsequently by a higher court, those remanded or vacated 
without instructions, and those not decided by trial, such as motions to 
dismiss, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or for summary 
judgment.121  And the final group comprises so-called attribution cases122 in 
which a shareholder’s action or status is imputed to the defendant corporation 
for the purposes of, inter alia, agriculture,123 arbitration,124 bankruptcy,125 
 
Piercing, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 77 (“This extension of a seriously flawed doctrine into a new 
arena is not required by statute and is insupportable as a matter of policy.”). 
116. E.g., Wicks v. Milzoco Builders, Inc., 470 A.2d 86, 89 (Pa. 1983) (“There is a distinction 
between liability for individual participation in a wrongful act and an individual’s responsibility for 
any liability-creating act performed behind the veil of a sham corporation.”). 
117. E.g., Advanced Constr. Corp. v. Pilecki, 901 A.2d 189, 195 (Me. 2006) (“Corporate 
officers who participate in wrongful acts can be held liable for their individual acts, and such 
liability is distinct from piercing the corporate veil.”). 
118. E.g., Explosives Corp. of Am. v. Garlam Enters. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 364, 368 (D.P.R. 
1985) (“[T]he doctrine of disregarding the corporate entity is distinct from the question of a 
successor’s liability . . . .”). 
119. See, e.g., Wicks, 470 A.2d at 88–90 (discussing the Superior Court’s erroneous conflation 
of direct liability with veil-piercing). 
120. See, e.g., Nursing Home Consultants, Inc. v. Quantum Health Servs., Inc., 926 F. Supp. 
835, 840 n.12 (E.D. Ark. 1996).  In Nursing Home Consultants, the court described triangular-
piercing and reverse-piercing as follows: 
Conceptually, a triangular pierce results from a sequential application of the traditional 
piercing doctrine and the ‘reverse piercing’ doctrine[,] which is itself controversial in 
that it allows corporations to be held liable for the acts of their 
shareholders, . . . permits two related, though independent, corporate entities . . . , 
corporations which hold no ownership interest in each other, to be held liable for the 
malfeasance of the other. 
Id. 
121. See, e.g., Carte Blanche (Sing.) PTE., Ltd. v. Diners Club Int’l, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 908, 914 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“The Second Circuit has noted that the question of piercing the corporate veil is a 
fact-intensive issue that generally must be submitted to the jury.” (citing Am. Protein Corp. v. AB 
Volvo, 844 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1988))).  Segregating summary judgment cases is also justified because 
of the asymmetrical standard and the different meanings to be ascribed to an outcome based on 
overwhelming evidence versus a genuine issue of material fact.  See, e.g., Joe S. Cecil et al., A 
Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 861, 886–89 (2007) (finding that 72% of motions in 2000 were filed by defendants 
(with a 49% success rate) versus 28% by plaintiffs (with a 36% success rate)); Kevin M. Clermont, 
Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1941 (2009) (“[I]t is easier to obtain 
summary judgment against the party who will bear at least the burden of production at trial . . . .”). 
122. See, e.g., Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1126 n.45 (Del. 1988) (“Under the 
attribution theory, only the precise conduct shown to be instigated by the parent is attributed to the 
parent; the rest of the subsidiary’s actions still pertain only to the subsidiary.  The two corporations 
remain distinct entities.” (citation omitted)). 
123. See, e.g., Morris Okun, Inc. v. Harry Zimmerman, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 346, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993) (“PACA [The Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act] establishes a statutory trust for the 
benefit of sellers and suppliers. . . .  This legal framework is to be distinguished from the piercing 
the veil doctrine . . . .”). 
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discrimination,126 environmental,127 ERISA/Social Security,128 jurisdiction,129 
labor,130 tax,131 and workers’ compensation claims.132 
 
124. See, e.g., Laborers’ Int’l Union v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 868 F.2d 573, 576 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(“The requirement for a judicial determination of the [contractual] obligation to arbitrate may not be 
circumvented in this case by relying on the parent-subsidiary relationship . . . .”). 
125. See, e.g., Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1967) (“Cases in bankruptcy . . . call 
for an entirely different evaluation of ‘fraud’ or ‘injustice’ than cases of controlled corporate 
subsidiaries, or as in this instance, a case of corporate tort.” (citations omitted)). 
126. See, e.g., Dearth v. Collins, 441 F.3d 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[T]here is nothing in 
Title VII that supports [the] claim that individual capacity liability can be imposed on the basis of 
the alter ego doctrine, and the only circuit that we found to have addressed the issue rejected the 
argument.”); Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d 249, 262 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Our rejection of the ‘alter ego’ 
theory is further supported by Congress’ aversion to individual liability under Title VII.”).  But see 
Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940–41 (7th Cir. 1999) (abrogating the “integrated 
enterprise” test for corporate parents under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act, and Title VII in favor of certain possibly justified scenarios).  In Papa, Judge 
Posner reasoned, 
If because of neglect of corporate formalities, or a holding out of the parent as the real 
party . . . a parent (or other affiliate) would be liable for the torts or breaches of 
contract of its subsidiary, it ought equally to be liable for the statutory torts created by 
federal antidiscrimination law. . . .   
. . . . 
. . . [W]e cannot think of a good reason why the legal principles governing affiliate 
liability should vary from statute to statute, unless the statute, or the particular policy 
that animates the statute, ordains a particular test. 
Id. at 941.  But “[t]he primary purpose of the Civil Rights Act, and Title VII in particular is 
remedial. . . .  To effectuate its purpose of eradicating the evils of employment discrimination, 
Title VII should be given a liberal construction.”  Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1336 (6th 
Cir. 1983), abrogated on other grounds, Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006).  This 
conflicts with the common law presumption against corporate disregard, which also involves an 
inquiry into control or domination that is substantively distinct from whether a parent constitutes an 
“employer” under the various statutes.  See, e.g., Worth, 276 F.3d at 259–61 (analyzing separately a 
defendant’s qualification as an employer under Title VII and its status as an alter ego of another 
corporation). 
127. See, e.g., Comm’r v. RLG, Inc., 755 N.E.2d 556, 563 (Ind. 2001) (“The responsible 
corporate officer doctrine is distinct from piercing the corporate veil, and explicitly expands liability 
beyond veil piercing.”). 
128. See, e.g., Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 933 F.2d 449, 461 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he 
corporate veil may be pierced more easily in ERISA cases than in pure [C]ontract cases in order to 
promote the federal policies underlying the statute . . . .”). 
129. See, e.g., Marine Midland Bank v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1981) (“In deciding 
whether the corporation is a real or a shell entity, the appropriate standard should not be the very 
stringent test, normally applied in other contexts, for piercing the corporate veil. . . .  The fiduciary 
shield doctrine . . . is not concerned with liability.  It is concerned with jurisdiction . . . .”). 
130. See, e.g., UA Local 343 of the United Ass’n of Journeymen v. Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48 
F.3d 1465, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The alter ego doctrine as developed in labor law is analytically 
different from the traditional veil-piercing doctrine as developed in corporate law.”). 
131. See, e.g., Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Utah 1979) 
(“[T]here are two separate and independent doctrines which act as a basis for the disregard of the 
corporate fiction.  The one is the equitable alter ego doctrine; the other involves disregarding the 
corporate fiction whenever it serves the purposes of the tax statute.”). 
132. See, e.g., Crissman v. Healthco Int’l, Inc., No. 89 C 8298, 1992 WL 223820, at *7 (N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 2, 1992) (“The traditional definition of a corporation’s alter ego . . . springs from an 
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These exclusions resulted in a final dataset of 2,908 cases.  Whenever a 
court applied separate veil-piercing analyses to different codefendant 
shareholders, the decision was split into separate entries.133  There are thus a 
total of 2,929 observations in the final dataset.  And whenever multiple 
claims, shareholders, or rationales appeared in a case, all of them were coded 
on a nonexclusive basis, and thus the totals for those observations exceed the 
total number of cases. 
To obtain a more fine-grained portrait, I collected data on specific 
subclaims.  Fraud claims were classified as Common Law Deceit or Fraud, 
Fraudulent Misrepresentation, Fraudulent Transfer, Innocent 
Misrepresentation, or Negligent Misrepresentation.134  Using Meir Dan-
Cohen’s scheme for measuring bargaining power, Contract claims were clas-
sified as bargains between individual(s) and organization(s), or between 
organization(s) and organization(s).135  And using Prosser and Keeton’s 
architecture, Tort claims were classified as Intentional Tort Against a Person, 
Intentional Tort Against Property, Negligence, Strict Liability, or Tortious 
Interference with Contract.136 
I also collected data on the rationales that seem instrumental to a court’s 
ultimate decision whether to pierce.  Fifteen categories were used: agency, 
alter ego, assumption of risk, commingling, control or domination, fraud or 
misrepresentation, informalities, injustice or unfairness, instrumentality, 
procedure, sham or shell, siphoning of funds, statutory policy, 
undercapitalization, and other.137  Subcategories also were used for certain 
rationales.  Commingling was divided into whether it involved advertising, 
accounts or assets, contracts, directors, employees, officers, records, retire-
ment plans, stationery, or taxes.  Fraud or misrepresentation was divided into 
 
entirely different context having little bearing upon the concerns underlying the Workers’ 
Compensation Act.”). 
133. This virtually tracks the distinction between corporate and individual shareholders. 
134. Also included within the Common Law Deceit or Fraud group were cases with an 
ambiguous reference to some kind of fraud claim. 
135. See MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 83 (1986) (“If 
organizations are to be acknowledged as distinctive legal actors, . . . the law has to deal with 
interactions among organizations (O-O relations), and with ‘mixed’ interactions, in which 
individuals interact with organizations (O-I relations).”).  Dan-Cohen’s scheme actually comprises 
three types of relations, id., but bargains as between individual(s) and individual(s) are not 
applicable here as one of the parties in a veil-piercing situation must be a corporation. 
136. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 7, at 31–
32 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that “[t]here are many possible approaches to the law of [T]orts, 
and . . . [b]y some odd coincidence, the classifications usually have gone by threes, and nearly 
everyone has found some ‘tripartite division,’” and proceeding to divide the area into three parts, 
based on the Restatement of Torts: intent, negligence, and strict liability).  But their treatise actually 
is organized around the five classic types of torts that are used here.  Id. at xv. 
137. But cf. Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1044 (using a universe of eighty-
five possible rationales organized into “several major categories”).  Thompson, however, presented 
select results for only twelve different rationales.  See id. at 1063 tbl.11, 1064–65 n.141.  Many of 
these rationales were used here to facilitate comparison, along with a few others based upon a 
survey of the cases. 
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whether it concerned a defendant corporation’s assets, ultimate shareholder’s 
identity, or some ambiguous reference.  Informalities was divided into a 
failure to conduct meetings, failure to maintain records, or some other 
irregularity.  Procedure was divided into whether it involved a failure to raise 
veil-piercing, inadequate pleading, or a jurisdictional defect.138  And 
undercapitalization was divided into whether there was inadequate capital at 
incorporation or some later time. 
The instrumental rationale data are the product of a subjective process.  
Thompson’s study collected data on whether a rationale simply was men-
tioned in connection with the decision whether to pierce.139  In contrast the 
present study’s data on instrumental rationales merely may indicate what 
courts choose to cite in support of their ultimate decision.140  To an extent 
this functionalist concern is constrained by the evidence available to a court 
as well as the court’s integrity in articulating a justification.141  More 
importantly, extracting a case’s ratio decidendi is fundamental to our 
precedent-based system, and publicly available cases are the only insight into 
judicial reasoning accessible to entrepreneurs, litigants, and other courts.142  
Accordingly, the present data most directly reflect what actually informs 
these parties’ deliberations. 
Thompson’s and this study’s results are subject to selection bias.  Both 
studies ran particular search phrases within Westlaw’s electronic database of 
cases over a certain time frame.143  Although Westlaw does feature 
 
138. The procedure rationale concerns the nature of the reason cited by a court in disposing of a 
case and not the issue in which veil-piercing was couched.  Thompson does not include procedure 
as a rationale for which data were collected, but he does devote a separate subsection to cases 
involving procedural questions, such as the fiduciary shield doctrine, that were included in his 
dataset.  See id. at 1059–60. 
139. See id. at 1044 (“[T]he reasons courts gave to explain their decision to either pierce or not 
pierce the corporate veil were collected.  These were less objective than the inquiries made above 
and reflected a judgment by the court to cite the presence or absence of certain factors.”). 
140. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 104 n.* (1930) (“‘I saw where 
justice lay, and the moral sense decided the court half the time; I then sat down to search the 
authorities . . . but I almost always found principles suited to my view of the case . . . .’” (emphasis 
removed) (quoting a personal letter from “a great American judge,” Chancellor Kent)). 
141. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 238–40 (1986) (articulating his theory of 
adjudication, “Law as [I]ntegrity”). 
142. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know 
How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1195 (1991) (“Published opinions are all 
most of us ever work from.”); Alan L. Tyree, Fact Content Analysis of Case Law: Methods and 
Limitations, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 2 (1981) (“[U]sing the reported facts of the judgment . . . is 
precisely what every lawyer does when reading a case for the purpose of applying it to, or 
distinguishing it from, the case which is currently being argued.”).  But cf., Mark A. Hall & 
Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 97 
(2008) (“As the quip goes in the world of computers: garbage in, garbage out.”). 
143. Thompson deserves considerable credit for his use of Westlaw, which had been introduced 
only about fifteen years prior to the completion of his study.  See, e.g., William G. Harrington, A 
Brief History of Computer-Assisted Legal Research, 77 LAW LIBR. J. 543, 543 (1985) (stating, in 
1985, that twenty years ago “[l]egal research by computer was unknown”).  Some, including this 
author, may recall the excruciating experience of working with user-unfriendly Westlaw-only 
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“unpublished” and “nonprecedential” dispositions, even these represent only 
a fraction of matters involving veil-piercing.144  Some matters arise and are 
resolved before even reaching a court.145  Further, after a complaint has been 
filed, some matters are arbitrated, mediated, settled, dismissed, or summarily 
adjudged prior to a trial,146 and there is evidence suggesting that settlement 
rates may vary based on the type of claim.147  Litigants’ attorney-fee 
arrangements, estimated probabilities of success, perceived significance of 
the dispute, and resources all also can affect a matter’s outcome.148  
Moreover, the decision to make a case available to Westlaw can be the 
product of selective discretion.149  Accordingly, publicly available decisions 
may reflect a myriad of dynamics independent of a matter’s merits.  Indeed, 
Thompson has speculated that some of these selection effects may explain 
the asymmetry of veil-piercing in Contract versus Tort: 
There may be some selection bias in this area or the parties may have 
different stakes in the outcome.  The change in [P]roduct-[L]iability 
 
computer terminals and waiting for tortoise-paced printouts.  More relevantly, ever since its debut, 
Westlaw has been expanding its databases’ coverage.  See, e.g., Peter W. Martin, Reconfiguring 
Law Reports and the Concept of Precedent for a Digital Age, 53 VILL. L. REV. 1, 21 (2008) (“It was 
not until the mid- to late 1990s that [Lexis and Westlaw] attained sufficient scope and functionality 
to become comprehensive research environments—virtual libraries—rather than simply places to 
begin case research.”).  The databases at Thompson’s disposal thus may have featured much 
narrower coverage than what was available for this study. 
144. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 119, 125–26 (2002) (“On the one hand, judicial decisions represent only the very tip of the 
mass of grievances. . . .  On the other hand, published decisions are a skewed sample of that tip of 
judicial decisions.”); David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 
WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 710 (2007) (examining dockets from four federal district courts and finding 
only 3.10% of judicial actions that resulted in an opinion). 
145. See, e.g., David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 
85–87 & fig.2 (1983) (conducting a survey of 5,000 households and finding that only about 5% of 
grievances, albeit only in excess of $1,000, result in a court filing). 
146. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 7, 8 (reporting 
that, from 1962 to 2004, the number of terminated civil cases increased 400% while trials fell 32%). 
147. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why 
Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 133 (2009) (examining two federal district 
court jurisdictions and finding that Tort cases settle at a higher rate than Contract cases). 
148. See generally Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical 
Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337 (1990); Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees 
and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What Does the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEXAS L. 
REV. 1943 (2002); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 
J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (all discussing how various factors impact what disputes are litigated). 
149. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 107 
(2002) (“While this [selection] rule commands that judges publish only those opinions that are ‘of 
general precedential value,’ a rather large body of literature suggests that the rule is sufficiently 
vague to permit circuit court judges to publish or not as they see fit.” (citations omitted)); 
Kimberly D. Krawiec & Kathryn Zeiler, Common-Law Disclosure Duties and the Sin of Omission: 
Testing the Meta-theories, 91 VA. L. REV. 1795 app. A at 1883–87 (2005) (detailing limitations of 
Westlaw’s databases and the possibility of systematic differences between federal and state court 
decisions); Karen Swenson, Federal District Court Judges and the Decision to Publish, 25 JUST. 
SYS. J. 121, 136 (2004) (finding that federal judges tend to publish opinions in which large 
corporations and other members of the “economic upper class” are parties). 
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law and [T]ort law generally in recent decades may have led plaintiffs 
to bring suits that go beyond prior law.  Additionally, the large 
number of corporate defendants may mean that they have more to lose 
than plaintiffs have to gain, pushing the results in the direction of less 
piercing.150 
As a result, the findings in both studies may present a rather skewed portrait 
of veil-piercing claims.151 
But this does not undermine the validity or utility of either study.  As a 
preliminary matter, veil-piercing is a remedial instrument for satisfying a 
judgment that stands apart from a matter’s substantive cause(s) of action;152 a 
veil-piercing request is thus among the last things courts tend to hear within a 
dispute.  This delayed ripeness would seem to mute selection effects 
somewhat, as the bulk of matters disposed by dismissal, summary judgment, 
or settlement will concern the substantive claim, and not veil-piercing; 
accordingly, the population of cases may be more representative here than 
for ordinary causes of action.  Further, the undeniable impact that publicly 
available cases have on the behavior of courts, firms, and litigants would 
seem to be quite stable, as the overall pattern of veil-piercing cases in the 
present study has remained relatively constant over time.153  Certainly, this 
study’s results should be understood as limited in scope and treated with ap-
propriate care.  But the continuing importance of Thompson’s study and its 
puzzling results within any discussion of veil-piercing provide sound reasons 
for conducting a new study with a comparable yet refined methodology. 
II. Findings 
Apparently the “mists of metaphor” envelop an empirical puzzle about 
veil-piercing.154  Thompson’s study suggests that veil-piercing claims are 
being adjudicated in unpredicted and inexplicable ways.155  We thus are pre-
sented with a puzzle involving commentators, courts, and the empirical 
 
150. Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1069–70. 
151. This is the premise of Christina L. Boyd and David Hoffman’s project, Disputing Limited 
Liability, 104 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1483278, 
which uses dockets to follow a sample of veil-piercing claims as they move through federal district 
courts over a five-year period; notably, they find that 66% of cases containing a veil-piercing claim 
ultimately settle and obtain results largely consistent with Thompson’s study.  Id. 
152. See, e.g., Kern v. Gleason, 840 S.W.2d 730, 736 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1992, no writ) 
(“The piercing of the corporate veil is not a separate cause of action . . . .  The various doctrines for 
disregarding the corporate entity are only remedial, for they only expand the potential sources of 
recovery.”). 
153. See infra Table 2. 
154. See Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) (“The whole problem of 
the relation between parent and subsidiary corporations is one that is still enveloped in the mists of 
metaphor.”). 
155. See Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1038 (“The results [of this study] 
suggest that the factors affecting the judicial outcome are not necessarily as suggested by previous 
commentary.”). 
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evidence.  Determining which of these key pieces are amiss may suggest how 
to diagnose the problems that plague veil-piercing.  And until this positive 
account of veil-piercing is resolved, engaging the normative question of what 
to do with the doctrine seems aimless. 
This study reexamines the empirical piece of veil-piercing.  Although 
basic statistics can reveal only so much, the doctrine’s complex nature neces-
sitates categorical reduction.  This Part sifts through all the data and analyzes 
the most notable results as they pertain to a court’s jurisdiction, the law 
applied, the supporting substantive claims, and the cited instrumental 
rationales; when valuable, results for combinations of these categories also 
are presented.156  This Part concludes with the results of recasting all of the 
data in terms of voluntary and involuntary creditors. 
A. Navigating the Jurisdictional Waters 
The present study finds an overall veil-piercing rate of 48.51%.  This is 
substantially higher than the 40.18% rate found by Thompson’s study157 and 
comports with George Priest and Benjamin Klein’s hypothesis that plaintiffs 
and defendants will prevail with equal frequency in tried cases.158  The over-
all rate vacillated until the 1960s, an amount of volatility that is not 
surprising given the relative paucity of cases up to that point. 
Since the 1970s, the number of veil-piercing cases has increased 
markedly, and the rate has stabilized.  The increase roughly coincides with 
the advent of unpublished and nonprecedential opinions, which comprise 
20.70% of the final dataset but whose veil-piercing rates do not deviate con-
siderably from the overall dataset.159 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
156. In the interest of economy, the discussion and tables do not present all the results for the 
numerous possible combinations of data. 
157. Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1048 tbl.1. 
158. See Priest & Klein, supra note 148, at 20 (noting that “the model has demonstrated a 
tendency toward 50 percent plaintiff victories in litigation”).  But see Clermont & Eisenberg, supra 
note 144, at 140 (“[O]ur work has shown that one should not expect 50% win rates.”). 
159. See infra Tables 1A–B. 
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Table 1A.  Veil-Piercing by Publication Status and Jurisdiction160 
Status n V-P Rate (%) 
Unpublished 605 48.60 
Federal 194 53.09 
State 411 46.67 
Partially Published 12 8.33 
Federal 12 8.33 
State 0 -- 
Published 2312 48.70 
Federal 647 46.68 
State 1665 49.49 
 
Table 1B.  Veil-Piercing by Precedential Status and Jurisdiction 
Status n V-P Rate (%) 
Precedential 2323 48.64 
Federal 647 46.68 
State 1676 49.50 
Non-Precedential 606 48.02 
Federal 206 50.49 
State 400 46.75 
 
Veil-piercing cases then exploded during the 1980s at a rate lower than the 
nationwide trend for all filings.161  All of these trends in the initial dataset are 
reflected in the number of final observations per year: 
 
 
160. Veil-piercing rates in bold exceed the overall rate of 48.51%. 
161. Prior to 1980 there was an average of 9.29 veil-piercing cases per year, which increased to 
63.4 cases per year from 1980 to 1989.  The highest number of veil-piercing cases for that entire 
decade came in 1989 and represents a 2.52% increase over the mean; 1989 also saw the highest 
number of federal and state filings for that entire decade and represents a 28.29% increase over the 
mean.  ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS (1980–
1993) (“United States District Courts—National Judicial Caseload Profile”); ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (1994–2006) (“Table C-2, 
U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by Basis of Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit During 
the Twelve Month Period Ended March 31”); COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE 
COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS (1981–1982, 1985–2007) (no data were collected 
for 1983 and 1984). 
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Figure 1.  Observations over Time, 1866–2006162 
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The line marks 1986, the end point of Thompson’s original study.163  Over 
the same time frame, there are 1,415 observations in this study;164 from 1986 
up to and including 2006, there are 1,514 observations.165 
Table 2.  Veil-Piercing by Decade 
Decade n % of Total V-P Rate (%) 
1860–1869 1 0.03 0.00 
1870–1879 1 0.03 100.00 
1880–1889 1 0.03 0.00 
1890–1899 6 0.20 66.67 
1900–1909 4 0.14 75.00 
1910–1919 23 0.79 60.87 
1920–1929 55 1.88 47.27 
1930–1939 173 5.91 52.02 
1940–1949 136 4.64 42.65 
1950–1959 145 4.95 57.93 
1960–1969 199 6.79 50.25 
1970–1979 319 10.89 49.53 
1980–1989 646 22.06 46.75 
1990–1999 718 24.51 46.38 
2000–2006 502 17.14 49.40 
 
162. See infra Table 2. 
163. See Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1044 (“This project includes all 
Westlaw cases through 1985 concerning the issue of piercing the corporate veil.”). 
164. Cf. id. at 1049 tbl.2 (reporting 1,585 cases up to and including 1985). 
165. But see supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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Veil-piercing claims prevail exclusively against close corporations. 
 
Table 3.  Veil-Piercing by Corporation Type 
Corporation n V-P Rate (%) 
Close 2925 48.58 
Public 4 0.00 
 
This is easily explained by the tendency of public corporations to feature 
disperse shareholding that in turn precludes a sufficient level of control or 
domination to justify veil-piercing.166  There are some successful piercing 
claims against close corporations held by a public corporate affiliate or 
parent, but the total data are incomplete given the failure of some decisions 
to specify the shareholder’s status. 
More difficult to explain is that veil-piercing clearly presents a greater 
risk to individual shareholders than corporate parents. 
 
Table 4.  Veil-Piercing by Shareholder Type and Jurisdiction 
Shareholder n V-P Rate (%) 
Entity 889 41.17 
Federal 377 37.14 
State 512 44.14 
Person 2047 51.69 
Federal 482 55.60 
State 1565 50.48 
 
These results not only comport with Thompson’s167 but hold across federal 
and state courts, as well as for each and every type of substantive claim.168  
 
166. See, e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 59, § 1.5.3, at 78–79 (“[R]equiring control screens out 
piercing against the shareholders of a publicly traded corporation . . . .  This provides a doctrinal 
underpinning to explain the fact that there never has been a case in which the court pierced to hold 
shareholders in a public corporation liable for the company’s debts.”). 
167. Cf. Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1055 tbl.7 (reporting a 43.13% rate 
for 339 individual-shareholder cases versus 37.21% for 237 corporate-parent cases); Thompson, 
Group Piercing, supra note 20, at 386 tbl.1 (reporting a 34.00% rate for 547 corporate-group cases 
up to and including 1996).  Matheson’s study finds a 20.56% veil-piercing rate: “This difference is 
substantial: substantive piercing in the parent-subsidiary context occurs approximately half as often 
as piercing does generally, and more than one-third less often than the most comparable database 
explored by other studies.”  Matheson, supra note 73, at 1114.  Matheson’s comparison with 
Thompson’s as well as Hodge and Sachs’s studies, however, makes the surprisingly simple error of 
mismatching time frames.  Thompson’s results concern all cases in his study up to and including 
1996.  Thompson, Group Piercing, supra note 20, at 385.  Hodge and Sachs’s sample consisted of 
cases from 1986 up to and including 1995.  Hodge & Sachs, supra note 73, at 347.  Matheson’s 
study, in contrast, examines cases from January 1, 1990 up to March 1, 2008.  Matheson, supra 
note 73, at 1108 n.51.  The problem is that the veil-piercing rate for corporate groups may have 
declined over Matheson’s time frame.  And this is in fact the case.  The present dataset finds a 
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The data collectively rebut a broad conviction that veil-piercing is more 
judicially compelling in the parent–subsidiary context.169  This chasm may be 
due to a multilevel misunderstanding.  There is apparently a prevailing belief 
and criticism that courts apply essentially the same test to corporate and indi-
vidual shareholders.170  While this was true at the turn of the twentieth 
century, when states began to permit corporate groups,171 courts now seem to 
have shifted their view: 
An individual shareholder, by virtue of his ownership of shares, does 
not own the corporation’s assets and, as a result, does not own 
subsidiary corporations in which the corporation holds an interest. . . .  
A corporate parent which owns the shares of a subsidiary does not, for 
that reason alone, own or have legal title to the assets of the 
 
42.63% rate for corporate-parent cases prior to 1990, versus a 38.96% rate for such cases from 1990 
up to and including 2006.  Cf. McPherson & Raja, supra note 73, at 18 (reporting a 16.46% veil-
piercing rate against corporate parents from a sample of cases from 1996 up to and including 2005).  
The decline is not very steep and the rate is considerably higher than Matheson’s, but this may be 
attributed to some considerable differences in the construction of the respective studies’ datasets.  
Compare Matheson, supra note 73, at 1109–12 (detailing Matheson’s methodology), with supra 
subpart I(B).  Far more important is that all of the empirical studies using nonsampled data find that 
individual shareholders are much more vulnerable to veil-piercing than corporate parents. 
168. See infra Figure 5; cf. Matheson, supra note 73, at 1122 tbl.7 (reporting specific results for 
claims against corporate groups). 
169. See, e.g., PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT, 
AND OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY 
CORPORATIONS, at xl (1987) (“[M]ost of the presumed advantages of limited liability are simply 
irrelevant where corporate groups are involved.”); supra note 26 and accompanying text.  Stephen 
Presser presents an interesting argument that a commitment to democratic individualism may 
explain the diverse coalition of scholars who are critical of extending broader limited liability 
protection to corporate groups.  See PRESSER, supra note 1, § 1:11, at 1-67. 
170. Kurt Strasser, for instance, has expressed this view succinctly: 
While traditional corporate law has not articulated different rules for a parent 
company in its role as a shareholder than for individual investor shareholders, parent 
companies in fact present different policy issues and their limited liability should be 
determined by a different analysis.  The core idea is that a parent company as a 
shareholder in its subsidiary companies is in quite a different economic role and 
performs quite a different management function than individual investor 
shareholders . . . .  The parent is not an independent investor. 
Kurt A. Strasser, Piercing the Veil in Corporate Groups, 37 CONN. L. REV. 637, 638 (2005).  There 
is yet another level, of no consequence here, with regard to the use of agency principles: 
It is useful to distinguish situations in which liability is imposed on a parent because of 
the existence of the agency relation . . . from cases in which the corporate veil of the 
subsidiary is pierced for other reasons of policy.  Unfortunately, however, the courts 
have not always observed the distinction between these two separate bases for parent’s 
liability. . . .  The erroneous language, however, has not resulted in unjust decisions in 
most cases. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14M reporter’s note (1958).  Interestingly, this language 
did not survive revision.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 reporter’s note (2006). 
171. See, e.g., BLUMBERG, supra note 168, at xxxix–xl (“When . . . corporate groups became 
possible . . . courts applied the same standard to a shareholder that was in fact a parent corporation 
even though ultimate investors were not involved at all.”); HENN, supra note 6, § 148, at 258 
(“Generally-speaking, the principles governing one-man, family, and other close corporations are 
applicable to subsidiary and other affiliated corporations.”).  But see supra note 169. 
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subsidiary; and, it follows with even greater force, the parent does not 
own or have legal title to the subsidiaries of the subsidiary.172 
This sweeping generalization contrasts with the academic debate, which has 
focused on the structure of economic incentives.  Some regard corporate 
shareholders as presenting a potentially greater moral-hazard problem,173 
while others view veil-piercing as a potential threat to stimulating investment 
in corporate parents.174  That courts reach into the assets of individual share-
holders more frequently does not mean the commentary is incorrect, merely 
that the antithetical positions seem to proceed from different premises. 
Far more congruous are the federal and state veil-piercing rates.  Federal 
litigants enjoy considerably more success in district court than in the court of 
appeals,175 which suggests that trial defendants may have an added incentive 
to seek reversal of an unfavorable decision.176 
 
Table 5.  Veil-Piercing by Jurisdiction and Court 
Court n V-P Rate (%) 
Federal 853 47.60 
Trial 413 54.72 
Intermediate Appellate 432 40.74 
Supreme 8 50.00 
State 2076 48.89 
Trial 192 44.79 
Intermediate Appellate 1318 48.48 
Supreme 566 51.24 
 
 
172. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 475 (2003) (citations omitted). 
173. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 111 (“[T]he moral-hazard problem is 
probably greater in parent-subsidiary situations because subsidiaries have less incentive to insure.”). 
174. See, e.g., PRESSER, supra note 1, § 1:11, at 1-67 (“Presumably, those who profit by 
reducing the risk to the parent are the parent’s shareholders, and, presumably, the more we reduce 
their risk and thereby raise the potential profit to them the more we will encourage their 
investment.”). 
175. The high veil-piercing rate in Supreme Court cases should be discounted given their 
miniscule number.  Not easily dismissed, however, is that the veil-piercing rate in federal district 
courts is higher than that in any other level of federal or state court.  This raises a potential 
representativeness concern with Boyd and Hoffman’s exclusively federal sample.  See Boyd & 
Hoffman, supra note 151 (manuscript at 27). 
176. But see, e.g., Chris Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary 
Insights into the “Affirmance Effect” on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 357, 359–63, 360 figs.2 & 3 (2005) (reporting an increase in the affirmance rate of the courts 
of appeals from 72% in 1945 to 91% in 2003, in contrast to a steady rate for the Supreme Court).  
To be clear, this study does not establish whether there is a weaker “affirmance effect” for veil-
piercing cases, as only the highest relevant decision from a case was coded and information on 
affirmances or reversals was not collected.  For instance, one possibility may be that losing 
plaintiffs pursue futile appeals on a disproportionate basis. 
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Although a federal common law does exist,177 veil-piercing is predominantly 
a creature of state law.  Consistent with the nature of corporation statutes as 
well as the most common types of substantive claims, state courts produced 
70.88% of the total observations.  Surprisingly, unlike their federal peers, 
state litigants appear to experience increasing veil-piercing success at succes-
sively higher levels of the judicial system.178  This, however, may reflect 
wrinkles within the original database’s scope, as Westlaw does not feature 
comprehensive coverage of state trial and intermediate appellate court 
decisions;179 the problem seems most pronounced at the trial court level, 
which accounts for only 9.25% of the total state observations.180  
Nevertheless, these results roughly comport with the rates for all other 
federal and state court levels as well as the overall rate; accordingly, if the 
state trial court results can be regarded as somewhat representative, then they 
suggest that plaintiffs with stronger cases tend to pursue appeals.181 
B. Exploring the State of Veil-Piercing 
Veil-piercing claims are susceptible to some forum shopping.  Potential 
defendants can exert some control by deciding where to incorporate and then 
attempting to invoke the internal-affairs doctrine, which applies the law of 
the state of incorporation to resolve certain choice-of-law disputes.182  Not all 
jurisdictions, however, apply the doctrine to veil-piercing disputes, either 
because a superior interest belongs to a nonincorporating state, or the tradi-
tional province of “internal affairs” concerns shareholder disputes with 
 
177. See, e.g., Bergesen v. Lindholm, 760 F. Supp. 976, 986 (D. Conn. 1991) (“[This] court 
applies federal common law, importing into its decision those principles of state law which it finds 
both persuasive and appropriate to subsume.”). 
178. The standard of review for veil-piercing cases varies among federal circuits as well as 
states.  See, e.g., Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 843 F.2d 145, 148 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing 
cases that variously apply either a “clearly erroneous” or a plenary/de novo standard of review to 
veil-piercing decisions). 
179. See, e.g., Morris L. Cohen, Researching Legal History in the Digital Age, 99 LAW LIBR. J. 
377, 386 (2007) (“Historical coverage of state court decisions in LexisNexis and Westlaw is still 
limited.  Both systems cover the highest court of most states back to their published beginnings, but 
retrospective coverage of lower courts is much less extensive.”). 
180. Cf. Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1050 tbl.4 (reporting only 401 trial 
court versus 860 intermediate appellate court decisions). 
181. But cf. Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State Courts?  An 
Empirical Study of State Court Trials on Appeal, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 121, 138 (2009) (finding that 
the reversal rates for state jury trials and appeals by defendants exceed those for plaintiffs). 
182. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) (“No principle of 
corporation law and practice is more firmly established than a State’s authority to regulate domestic 
corporations . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 304 (1971) (“The local law 
of the state of incorporation will be applied to determine the right of a shareholder to participate in 
the administration of the affairs of the corporation . . . except in the unusual case where . . . some 
other state has a more significant relationship . . . .”); id. §§ 145, 186–88 (indicating different 
choice-of-law rules for Tort versus Contract claims). 
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managers, not external creditors.183  Comparatively clearer is the choice af-
forded to prospective plaintiffs, whether voluntary or involuntary,184 by the 
opportunity to evaluate where to commence a suit.  In this regard, one im-
portant consideration might be whether a jurisdiction exhibits a relatively lax 
stance towards piercing. 
Veil-piercing rates vary substantially based on which state’s law is 
applied.185  Litigants prevail at least 50.00% of the time under the law of 
twenty-five different jurisdictions: 
 
Figure 2.  Overall v. State Law Veil-Piercing Rates186 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
183. Compare Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 
J. CORP. L. 33, 94 n.311 (2006) (“Personal liability of officers, directors, and shareholders to the 
corporation and its creditors falls squarely within the traditional understanding of internal affairs.”), 
with Jennifer J. Johnson, Risky Business: Choice-of-Law and the Unincorporated Entity, 1 J. SMALL 
& EMERGING BUS. L. 249, 272–73, 273 n.91 (1997) (observing that, while “[t]here is a general 
consensus that the doctrine . . . extends to the personal liability of shareholders for corporate debts,” 
a few courts “have applied other conflicts theories to piercing issues”). 
184. But cf. Hansmann & Kraakman, Procedural Focus, supra note 91, at 450–51 (arguing for 
application of the internal-affairs doctrine only to voluntary creditors, versus traditional conflicts 
rules for involuntary creditors). 
185. As with Thompson’s study, the data here were not organized by jurisdiction as some cases 
may apply foreign law, and the origin of the relevant test has a more direct bearing on the ultimate 
decision to pierce.  See Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1044 (stating that the 
factual data presented include which jurisdiction’s law was applied in the case, not the jurisdiction 
in which the case was litigated). 
186. See infra Table 6.  Due to a lack of space, Table 6 omits data for cases applying the law of 
foreign jurisdictions (0.00%, 1 case), Guam (100.00%, 3 cases), Northern Mariana Islands (50.00%, 
2 cases), Puerto Rico (50.00%, 6 cases), and the Virgin Islands (0.00%, 1 case).  Of these 
jurisdictions Thompson reported data only from Puerto Rico.  See Thompson, Empirical Piercing, 
supra note 20, at 1051 tbl.6.  For the curious, using the 2000 Presidential Electoral College results, 
the veil-piercing rate was 49.75% in “Blue States” versus 45.77% in “Red States.”  See 2000 
Presidential Electoral and Popular Vote Table, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, http://www.fec. 
gov/pubrec/fe2000/elecpop.htm (displaying the 2000 electoral college results broken up by Red 
States going to George Bush and Blue States going to Al Gore). 
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All of the shaded states have a veil-piercing rate above the overall rate of 
48.51%, with the five darkest states featuring a rate in excess of 66.66%.  
The remaining states have a veil-piercing rate below the overall rate, with the 
three dotted states—Maryland, New Hampshire, and Virginia—featuring a 
rate less than 33.33%. 
 
Table 6.  Veil-Piercing by Jurisdiction Law Applied 
State Law n % of Total V-P Rate (%) 
Alabama 40 1.37 50.00 
Alaska 14 0.48 57.14 
Arizona 30 1.02 33.33 
Arkansas 44 1.50 56.82 
California 232 7.92 50.86 
Colorado 34 1.16 44.12 
Connecticut 74 2.53 54.05 
Delaware 35 1.19 34.29 
District of Columbia 23 0.79 52.17 
Federal 111 3.79 44.14 
Florida 105 3.58 40.95 
Georgia 86 2.94 59.30 
Hawaii 8 0.27 75.00 
Idaho 20 0.68 40.00 
Illinois 80 2.73 52.50 
Indiana 39 1.33 61.54 
Iowa 33 1.13 39.39 
Kansas 39 1.33 61.54 
Kentucky 25 0.85 48.00 
Louisiana 112 3.82 38.39 
Maine 7 0.24 42.86 
Maryland 31 1.06 25.81 
Massachusetts 62 2.12 43.55 
Michigan 83 2.83 39.76 
Minnesota 51 1.74 47.06 
Mississippi 17 0.58 47.06 
Missouri 87 2.97 48.28 
Montana 16 0.55 68.75 
Nebraska 36 1.23 61.11 
Nevada 16 0.55 43.75 
New Hampshire 10 0.34 30.00 
New Jersey 57 1.95 49.12 
New Mexico 16 0.55 37.50 
New York 269 9.18 49.81 
North Carolina 32 1.09 53.13 
North Dakota 7 0.24 85.71 
Ohio 179 6.11 55.87 
         (continued) 
116 Texas Law Review [Vol. 89:81 
 
 
Table 6 (cont.).  Veil-Piercing by Jurisdiction Law Applied 
State Law n % of Total V-P Rate (%) 
Oklahoma 27 0.92 51.85 
Oregon 35 1.19 65.71 
Pennsylvania 162 5.53 44.44 
Rhode Island 15 0.51 53.33 
South Carolina 25 0.85 60.00 
South Dakota 6 0.20 83.33 
Tennessee 47 1.60 68.09 
Texas 211 7.20 40.76 
Utah 26 0.89 53.85 
Vermont 5 0.17 40.00 
Virginia 55 1.88 29.09 
Washington 69 2.36 44.93 
West Virginia 14  0.48 50.00 
Wisconsin 34 1.160 61.76 
Wyoming 21 0.72 61.90 
 
One might expect a sizable number of cases to apply Delaware law, as 
the jurisdiction is an epicenter of corporate law.187  But this is not the case, 
perhaps because Delaware seems to be the preferred choice of relatively so-
phisticated incorporators that may have a keener awareness of the veil-
piercing standard.188  Despite the sea of ink spilled on the race for corporate 
charters, there has been a curiously limited amount of focus on whether a 
stiffer veil-piercing standard may enhance a jurisdiction’s appeal to prospec-
tive incorporators.189  In this regard, Delaware law does not disappoint, with 
a very low 34.29% veil-piercing rate and litigants prevailing a mere 21.43% 
of the time against corporate parents, as compared to 40.91% against 
 
187. See David Rosenberg, Supplying the Adverb: The Future of Corporate Risk-Taking and 
the Business Judgment Rule, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 216, 239 (2009) (discussing factors that have 
“made Delaware a center of American corporate law for generations”). 
188. See, e.g., Jens Dammann & Matthias Schündeln, The Incorporation Choices of Privately 
Held Corporations 9 tbl.2 (The Univ. of Texas Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 119, 
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1049581 (finding that 53.10% of corporations that 
incorporate outside of the state of their principal place of business choose Delaware). 
189. While the Cary–Winter debate has raged for decades, see generally ROBERTA ROMANO, 
THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 14–31 (1993), veil-piercing has become involved 
only recently.  See, e.g., Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 187, at 18 tbl.4 (finding the risk of 
veil-piercing to be a statistically significant consideration in where to incorporate for corporations 
with at least 1,000 employees); Douglas G. Smith, A Federalism-Based Rationale for Limited 
Liability, 60 ALA. L. REV. 649, 669 (2009) (“To the extent limited liability is preserved, so is 
shareholder wealth.  Thus, all other things being equal, one would expect that shareholders and 
corporate managers would be attracted to states with strong doctrines of limited liability.”).  But see, 
e.g., Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers 
in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 437–41 (2003) (arguing from history that limited 
liability may not have been a primary consideration for incorporators); Presser, supra note 59, at 
159 (“[I]t is the quality of the investment opportunity itself, and not the elimination of possible 
personal liability, that leads an investor to commit his or her capital.”). 
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individuals.  These results suggest that the state’s purported reputation for 
engaging in a “race to the bottom” remains intact.190  And that reputation has 
roots within substantive law, as a long-standing strict requirement of “fraud 
or something like it” coheres with the observation that piercing the veil under 
Delaware law is “comparatively difficult.”191 
The distinction of being the most difficult jurisdiction in which to pierce 
belongs to Maryland.  Veil-piercing claims prevailed a paltry 25.81% of the 
time and never against a corporate parent.192  This appears to be the con-
scious product of Maryland’s courts, which have described attempts to pierce 
the veil under their state law as a “[H]erculean task.”193  Like Delaware, this 
may be attributed to a “markedly restrictive approach” that requires proof of 
actual common law fraud or evasion of a statute to justify veil-piercing.194  
 
190. Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32, 56–57 
(2004) (explaining that the promanagement trajectory of Delaware law is consistent with a “race to 
the bottom”).  But see, e.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation 
Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 279 (1985) (finding positive cumulative abnormal returns for 
firms that reincorporate in Delaware, suggesting that the state is actually leading a race to the top).  
By comparison, Thompson found absolutely no successful veil-piercing in eleven cases applying 
Delaware law prior to 1986.  See Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1051 tbl.6.  
Contra Equitable Trust Co. v. Gallagher, 99 A.2d 490, 493 (Del. 1953) (“But the corporate entity is 
here of no importance. . . .  We have here . . . the important facts that the defendant owned a clear 
majority of the stock . . . and that he personally dominated the corporation in all its 
operations . . . .”); Ford v. Harris Moving & Storage, Inc., C.A. No. 6359, 1981 WL 15151, at *1 
(Del. Ch. June 16, 1981) (“Mr. Harris’ manipulation of his corporation for his own benefit calls for 
a disregard of the corporate entity, the piercing of the corporate veil and the imposition of personal 
liability . . . .”); Ne. Loan v. Furniture Mart, C.A. No. 4901, 1977 WL 9536, at *6  (Del. Ch. 
Sept. 21, 1977) (holding that the “corporate identity will be disregarded if its purpose is to shield 
fraud, as I am satisfied was the case here”).  Thompson also reported no successful veil-piercing in 
three cases applying Puerto Rican law.  See Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1051 
tbl.6, 1053 n.91.  Contra Forastieri v. E. Air Lines, Inc., No. Civ. 79-2544(PG), 1983 WL 364564, 
at *7 (D.P.R. July 5, 1983) (“[W]hen the result was to cause the corporation to default before the 
principals of the corporation . . . it is fully justifiable for a court to pierce and disregard the 
corporate veil and find plaintiffs to be one with the corporation . . . .”). 
191. PRESSER, supra note 1, § 2:8, at 2-73; see also supra note 97 and accompanying text.  
Recent decisions relaxing the “fraud or something like it” requirement, however, suggest to Presser 
that “the days of Delaware as a state where it was exceptionally difficult to pierce the corporate veil 
may be numbered.”  PRESSER, supra note 1, § 2:8, at 2-88.  From 1986 up to and including 2006, 
38.46% of veil-piercing claims under Delaware law prevailed. 
192. But see Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1051 tbl.6 (finding a 
comparatively liberal 40.00% rate in 15 pre-1986 cases). 
193. Dixon v. Process Corp., 382 A.2d 893, 895 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978) (“[W]oe unto the 
creditor who seeks to rip away the corporate facade in order to recover from one sibling of the 
corporate family what is due from another in the belief that the relationship is inseparable, if not 
insufferable, for his is a [H]erculean task.”). 
194. Ice. Telecom, Ltd. v. Info. Sys. & Networks Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 585, 591 (D. Md. 
2003); see also G. Michael Epperson & Joan M. Canny, The Capital Shareholder’s Ultimate 
Calamity: Pierced Corporate Veils and Shareholder Liability in the District of Columbia, 
Maryland, and Virginia, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 605, 637 (1988) (describing Maryland’s approach as 
a “bright-line test” that affords little judicial discretion). 
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Indeed, attempts to expand the standard to permit a mere showing of a need 
“to enforce a paramount equity” apparently have failed.195 
If Maryland resembles Hercules, then North and South Dakota are the 
Scylla and Charybdis of veil-piercing.196  Although there is a miniscule num-
ber of cases in these jurisdictions, North Dakota’s 85.71% and South 
Dakota’s 83.33% are two of the highest veil-piercing rates within the 
dataset.197  And these states share more than just geographical proximity.  
Neither jurisdiction requires a showing of actual fraud, instead permitting 
proof of injustice or unfairness to suffice.198  Further, both states find evi-
dence of inadequate capitalization to be important, if not compelling.199  
Based on his comprehensive state-by-state review, Stephen Presser describes 
North Dakota as producing “one of the purest undercapitalization cases ever 
decided in the United States,” that seems to “squarely fit within [Henry 
Winthrop] Ballantine’s . . . theory that undercapitalization alone could sup-
port piercing the veil.”200 
Not surprisingly, California law is among the most frequently applied to 
veil-piercing cases and features a 50.86% rate.201  Ballantine’s “optimistic 
 
195. Residential Warranty Corp. v. Bancroft Homes Greenspring Valley, Inc., 728 A.2d 783, 
789 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (“Despite the proclamation that a court may pierce the corporate veil 
to enforce a paramount equity, arguments that have urged a piercing of the veil ‘for reasons other 
than fraud’ have failed in Maryland courts.” (quoting Travel Comm., Inc. v. Pan Am. World 
Airways, Inc., 603 A.2d 1301, 1317 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992))).  Whether veil-piercing lies within 
law or equity, though, is a matter of dispute among some courts.  See, e.g., G-I Holdings, Inc. v. 
Bennet (In re G-I Holdings, Inc.), 380 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476 (D.N.J. 2005) (“A circuit split exists as 
to whether the nature of the relief in an action to pierce the corporate veil is legal or equitable.”). 
196. Cf. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 217 (Robert Fitzgerald trans., Vintage Classics 1990) (“And all 
this time,/in travail, sobbing, gaining on the current,/we rowed into the strait—Skylla to port and on 
our starboard beam Kharybdis, dire/gorge of the salt sea tide.”). 
197. Cf. Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1051 tbl.6 (finding a 75.00% rate for 
4 North Dakota cases and a 62.50% for 8 South Dakota cases).  Guam’s 100.00% rate is the highest, 
but the mere 3 cases in the dataset apply a test lifted from California law.  See, e.g., Associated Ins. 
Underwriters, Inc. v. Guam Int’l Insurers, Inc., Civ. No. 90-00059A, 1991 WL 336911, at *2 (D. 
Guam June 18, 1991) (applying the Ninth Circuit’s alter-ego test, which is derived from California 
law). 
198. See, e.g., Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 563–64 (N.D. 1985) (“We . . . follow the 
generally accepted rule that proof of fraud is not a necessary prerequisite for disregarding the 
corporate entity. . . .  [T]here must exist an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness . . . .”); 
Mobridge Cmty. Indus., Inc. v. Toure, Ltd., 273 N.W.2d 128, 132 (S.D. 1978) (finding a sufficient 
reason for veil-piercing to be “when retention of the corporate fiction would ‘produce injustices and 
inequitable consequences’”). 
199. The Dakotas, however, appear to take different approaches to the Contract–Tort 
distinction.  Compare Jablonsky, 377 N.W.2d at 565 (embracing “the attitude toward judicial 
piercing of the corporate veil [that] is more flexible in [T]ort, as opposed to ordinary [C]ontract 
actions”), with Glanzer v. St. Joseph Indian Sch., 438 N.W.2d 204, 209 (S.D. 1989) (suggesting 
disagreement with the view that “some courts are more hesitant to pierce the corporate veil in 
[C]ontract cases than [T]ort cases”). 
200. PRESSER, supra note 1, § 2:38, at 2-443; see also infra notes 201–03 and accompanying 
text. 
201. Cf. Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1051 tbl.6 (finding a 44.94% rate for 
89 pre-1986 cases). 
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reading of prior cases”202 about the sufficiency of undercapitalization argu-
ably has contributed to California’s reputation “as one of the jurisdictions 
most likely to pierce the corporate veil.”203  Robert Clark, however, has 
pointed out that undercapitalization alone is insufficient to justify veil-
piercing in California.204  Rather, the jurisdiction’s relatively high veil-
piercing rate may be attributable to an amorphous and liberal standard from 
that supreme court of which Cardozo would be proud: 
As the separate personality of the corporation is a statutory privilege, 
it must be used for legitimate business purposes and must not be 
perverted.  When it is abused it will be disregarded and the 
corporation looked at as a collection or association of individuals, so 
that . . . the stockholders [will be] liable for acts done in the name of 
the corporation.205 
This standard might suggest that individual shareholders are more vulnerable 
to veil-piercing than their corporate peers under California law,206 but the 
results indicate that the distinction bears no difference.  Courts reach into the 
assets of an individual shareholder 50.28% of the time, as compared to 
51.79% of the time for corporate parents, which is among the more notable 
exceptions to the overall results in this regard.207 
New York and Ohio law also rank among the most prominent producers 
of veil-piercing cases with a rate exceeding the total dataset.208  As a 
 
202. Clark, supra note 85, at 547 n.108 (“California courts have emphasized the importance of 
inadequate capitalization. . . .  These cases relied heavily on Ballantine’s rather optimistic reading of 
prior cases . . . .”). 
203. PRESSER, supra note 1, § 2:5, at 2-31; see also id. § 1:9, at 1-51 to 1-52.  But see 
Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1052 (speculating that California’s relatively 
extended retention of a corporate statute providing for shareholder liability until 1931 “probably 
contributed to a perception that public policy in California favored piercing the corporate veil”). 
204. See CLARK, supra note 15, at 81 n.10 (“[A]t least in recent years, inadequate capitalization 
per se does not trigger veil piercing in California . . . .”). 
205. Mesler v. Bragg Mgmt. Co., 702 P.2d 601, 606 (Cal. 1985).  In Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. 
Co., 155 N.E. 58 (N.Y. 1926), Justice Cardozo proposed his own opaque alternative to the 
metaphorical alter ego test: 
The logical consistency of a juridicial conception will indeed be sacrificed at times, 
when . . . essential to the end that some accepted public policy may be defended or 
upheld. . . .  At such times unity is ascribed to parts . . . for the reason that only thus can 
we overcome a perversion of the privilege to do business in a corporate form. 
Id. at 61.  In essence Cardozo’s test relies on basic agency principles unless there is insufficient 
evidence of control by a corporate parent; in that circumstance, a judicially identified public policy 
(that arguably requires some kind of statutory source) may be used to thwart a perceived 
“perversion” of concessionary privilege.  Id.  But see Michael, supra note 19, at 57 (“It makes no 
logical sense to base veil-piercing in a theory of corporate privilege.”). 
206. See PRESSER, supra note 1, § 2:5, at 2-46 (observing that California courts “seem to have 
adopted a more conservative approach to piercing the veil in recent cases involving parent-
subsidiary corporations, [but] they may occasionally pierce the veil with less hesitation in cases 
involving individually-owned corporations”). 
207. See infra Table 4. 
208. The top five producers of veil-piercing cases are, in order: New York, California, Texas, 
Ohio, and Pennsylvania.  But see Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann O’Hara, Corporations and the 
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prominent rival to Delaware for corporations, New York has a veil-piercing 
doctrine described as “nearly impregnable.”209  This characterization would 
seem to be at odds with the 49.81% veil-piercing rate, but federal and state 
courts apply somewhat different tests for New York.210  Federal courts in 
New York, which pierce 56.41% of the time, appear to apply the common 
alter ego test that requires proof of control or domination, as well as fraud or 
inequity;211 in contrast, New York’s state courts, which pierce 42.76% of the 
time, appear to require an additional prong of “perversion of the privilege to 
do business in a corporate form” that is a seeming tribute to their legendary 
jurist, Cardozo.212  Ohio’s 55.87% veil-piercing rate is considerably simpler 
to explain, as courts apply a fairly liberal standard that does not require proof 
of actual or constructive fraud.213  What is perhaps most notable about the 
jurisdiction is the discrepancy between the mere fourteen cases applying 
 
Market for Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 661, 679–80 (“California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, New 
York, and Texas each have statutes that provide for the automatic enforcement of choice-of-law 
clauses that designate the state’s law in high value contracts.”).  Pennsylvania and Texas both 
feature a rate lower than the total dataset.  When Pennsylvania law is applied, 44.44% of claims 
prevail, which suggests the “strong presumption” against veil-piercing professed by the state’s 
Supreme Court may be aspirational.  Lumax Indus., Inc. v. Aultman, 669 A.2d 893, 895 (Pa. 1995).  
Cf. Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1051 tbl.6 (finding a comparatively paltry 
30.77% rate in 65 pre-1986 Pennsylvania cases).  Moreover, the jurisdiction features an unsettled 
and unclear test, which has been described as “somewhat obscure.”  PRESSER, supra note 1, § 2:42, 
at 2-496; see also Good v. Holstein, 787 A.2d 426, 430 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (“[T]here appears to 
be no clear test or well settled rule in Pennsylvania . . . as to exactly when the corporate veil can be 
pierced . . . .”); First Realvest, Inc. v. Avery Builders, Inc., 600 A.2d 601, 604 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) 
(“[T]here is no definitive test for piercing the corporate veil.”).  When Texas law is applied, 40.76% 
of claims prevail, although that jurisdiction has taken distinct approaches over time.  See infra notes 
214–28 and accompanying text; cf. Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1051 tbl.6 
(finding a 34.91% rate in 106 pre-1986 Texas cases). 
209. William D. Harrington, Business Associations, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 25, 65 (1992); see 
also William Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Waters, 890 F.2d 594, 600 (2d Cir. 1989) (“It is well settled that 
New York courts are reluctant to disregard the corporate entity.”). 
210. By comparison, Thompson found a 34.91% rate in 212 pre-1986 cases, but he does not 
provide federal and state splits.  Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1051 tbl.6.  The 
difference in New York federal and state courts also is manifest in their piercing rates based on the 
type of the shareholders.  New York federal courts reach into the assets of an individual shareholder 
(70.49%) far more frequently than those of corporate parents (46.43%); these rates are both 
considerably higher than those of the state courts, which also reach into the assets of individual 
shareholders (48.67%) far more frequently than those of corporate parents (25.64%). 
211. See, e.g., David v. Glemby Co., 717 F. Supp. 162, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (describing New 
York’s  two-part test). 
212. See, e.g., Guptill Holding Corp. v. State, 307 N.Y.S.2d 970, 973 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970) 
(“Incorporations are, however, subject to ‘tests of honesty and justice’ and will be ignored if a 
‘perversion of the privilege to do business in a corporate form.’ . . .  Another factor looked to . . . is 
complete dominion and control . . . .”); supra note 204. 
213. See, e.g., Belvedere Condo. Unit Owners’ Ass’n v. R.E. Roark Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1075, 
1086 (Ohio 1993) (adopting the rule announced in Bucyrus–Erie Co. v. Gen. Prods. Corp., 643 F.2d 
413, 419 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding that “[t]hough fraud is a frequent ground for application of the 
alter ego doctrine, it is not essential”)).  The veil-piercing rate for individual versus corporate 
shareholders approximates the overall dataset. 
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Ohio law in Thompson’s study and the fifty-two observations in this dataset 
over the same time frame.214 
Finally, Texas provides an interesting case study of different approaches 
to veil-piercing.  Prior to 1986, Texas courts applied essentially an alter ego 
test, plus a catchall “exceptional situations”215 provision that was criticized as 
so “difficult to describe”216 as to be “almost totally useless,”217 not to men-
tion interpreted expansively by courts.218  At the same time, courts also 
seemed to place inordinate emphasis on whether a defendant corporation had 
failed to follow basic formalities219 or commingled affairs or assets,220 
contributing to the jurisdiction’s overall reputation as relatively “lenient” for 
veil-piercing plaintiffs.221 
In 1986 this leniency reached its apex.  The Supreme Court of Texas 
ruled in Castleberry v. Branscum222 that veil-piercing would be justified 
when there was evidence of an inequitable result, even when corporate for-
malities had been observed and commingling was absent.223  Alternatively, 
and more significantly, a request for veil-piercing grounded in either 
Contract or Tort could prevail by demonstrating that the defendant 
corporation was a sham used to perpetuate merely constructive, and not 
 
214. See Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1051 tbl.6 (finding a 57.14% rate in 
14 pre-1986 cases).  The veil-piercing rate for Ohio law in the present study is roughly comparable 
over Thompson’s time frame (55.77%) as well as the remaining period (55.91%), but the 
considerably larger number of Ohio observations (among other jurisdictions) in this dataset 
certainly contributes to the two studies’ different overall rates. 
215. See, e.g., Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 431 S.W.2d 336, 339 n.3, 340 (Tex. 
1968) (observing that “‘individual officers, directors or stockholders’” will not be held liable 
“‘except where it appears that the individuals are using the corporate entity as a sham to perpetuate 
a fraud, to avoid personal liability, avoid the effect of a statute, or in a few other exceptional 
situations’” (quoting Pace Corp. v. Jackson, 284 S.W.2d 340, 351 (Tex. 1955))). 
216. 1 IRA P. HILDEBRAND, THE LAW OF TEXAS CORPORATIONS 43 (1942). 
217. Robert W. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 979, 982 (1971). 
218. See, e.g., Bell, 431 S.W.2d at 340 (noting that an arrangement that “in all probability will 
result in prejudice to those dealing with one or more of the units . . . or one which has actually 
resulted in the complaining party’s having been placed in a position of disadvantage” easily would 
suffice); First Nat’l Bank v. Gamble, 132 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex. 1939) (finding that “an adherence 
to the fiction of the separate existence . . . would, under the particular circumstances, sanction a 
fraud or promote injustice”). 
219. See, e.g., Coastal Shutters & Insulation, Inc. v. Derr, 809 S.W.2d 916, 921 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (listing “the degree to which the corporate formalities are 
followed” as the first of four factors used to establish an “alter ego” claim). 
220. See, e.g., State v. Swift & Co., 187 S.W.2d 127, 131–32 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1945, 
writ ref’d n.r.e.) (describing the role of the courts in policing commingled stock ownership and 
corporate management as protecting “public convenience” and enforcing laws). 
221. See, e.g., Minchen v. Van Trease, 425 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th 
Dist.] 1968, writ ref’d) (observing that Texas courts are more lenient than other jurisdictions as to 
veil-piercing). 
222. 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986). 
223. Id. at 271 (citing Bell, 431 S.W.2d at 340, as well as analogous applications to fiduciary 
duties, fraudulent transfers, and trust funds).  Notably, the cited portion of Bell contains absolutely 
no mention of corporate formalities. 
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actual, fraud.224  The ensuing “uproar in the business community”225 
eventually triggered a nullificatory reaction by the state legislature, which 
amended Article 2.21A of the Texas Business Corporation Act, effective 
August 28, 1989, to reinstate a requirement of actual fraud against only 
Contract creditors.226 
These events have had a significant impact on veil-piercing cases.  Prior 
to Castleberry 38.83% of all veil-piercing opinions under Texas law resulted 
in success, which indicates that the jurisdiction’s reputation for leniency was 
unfounded.227  But this overall rate exploded to 60.00% during the three 
years after the decision, and has retreated to 40.22% since the enactment of 
Article 2.21A up to and including 2006. 
 
 
224. Id. at 273.  The court had previously distinguished constructive fraud from actual fraud: 
“Actual fraud usually involves dishonesty of purpose or intent to deceive, whereas constructive 
[F]raud is the breach of some legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of moral guilt, the law 
declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive others, to violate confidence, or to injure 
public interests.”  Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735, 740 (Tex. 1964).  But see Castleberry, 721 
S.W.2d at 277–78 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (“This standard is so broad that it is not a standard.  It 
fails to provide any guidance on the necessary elements to assert a cause of action under this 
theory. . . .  In his attempt to disregard the corporate entity in this case, Castleberry only pleaded an 
alter ego theory.”).  According to the slim majority, the failure to plead a sham theory was not fatal 
because “the purpose in disregarding the corporate fiction . . . ‘should not be thwarted by adherence 
to any particular theory of liability.’”  Id. at 273 (majority opinion) (quoting Gentry v. Credit Plan 
Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571, 575 (Tex. 1975)). 
225. Farr v. Sun World Sav. Ass’n, 810 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1991, no writ). 
226. Act of May 12, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 217, § 1, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 974, 974–75.  
Due to some apparent confusion about the applicability of Article 2.21 to theories that were not 
identified explicitly, the Texas legislature further amended 2.21(A)(2) in 1993 to include “the alter 
ego of the corporation” or some “other similar theory” as invalid grounds for imposing shareholder 
liability.  Act of May 7, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 215, § 2.05(A)(2), 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 418, 
446; see also W. Horizontal Drilling, Inc. v. Jonnet Energy Corp., 11 F.3d 65, 69 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(“[T]he Texas Supreme Court seems to be ignoring the amendments to article 2.21 and continues to 
permit a failure to observe corporate formalities as a means of proving alter ego.”).  Further, even 
though explicitly concerned with only Contracts, the provision also was applied to certain Torts.  
See, e.g., Menetti v. Chavers, 974 S.W.2d 168, 174 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (“[T]he 
actual fraud requirement should be applied, by analogy, to [T]ort claims, especially those arising 
from contractual obligations.”).  In an effort to “curb the creativity of the bench and the bar,” 
Alan W. Tompkins & Ted S. O’Neal, Corporations and Limited Liability Companies, 51 SMU L. 
REV. 817, 825 (1998), the legislature again amended 2.21 by adding “any matter relating to or 
arising from the obligation” to “any contractual obligation.”  Act of May 13, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., 
ch. 375, § 7(A)(2), 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 1516, 1522. 
227. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 3.  Texas Veil-Piercing, Castleberry to Article 2.21A228 
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Most interestingly, the post-Castleberry rate of veil-piercing claims in 
Contract is lower than before the decision.  During the three years between 
the decision and Article 2.21A there was only one case involving a Tort 
claim.  Castleberry’s liberalization of the requirements for veil-piercing in 
Contract thus may have incentivized litigants to recharacterize Tort claims 
when possible, but the overall paucity of cases combined with an extremely 
short time frame limits the reliability of the data for Tort, and, to an extent, 
for all other claims during that span.229  Nevertheless, the data support a story 
of how changes to a jurisdiction’s veil-piercing standard can affect litigant 
behavior and success. 
C. Reclaiming the Substantive Divide 
Due to its remedial nature, a veil-piercing request must be couched in a 
substantive cause of action.230  Particular caution should be exercised with 
any data about substantive claims, however, as they feature a layer of ambi-
 
228. There are only two veil-piercing claims grounded in the corporation statute.  See TEX. 
BUS. ORGS. CODE § 21.223(a)(1), (b) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Regular and First Called 
Sessions) (codifying Article 2.21A as effective January 1, 2010). 
229. Between Castleberry and Article 2.21A there were only fifteen veil-piercing observations, 
of which eleven were in Contract and four were in Fraud.  Ironically, Castleberry appears to have 
elevated the prominence of fraud or misrepresentation as an instrumental rationale.  Prior to the 
decision, that rationale was relied upon infrequently, with only 45 observations and a 26.67% 
success rate.  During the three years after the decision, however, the frequency of the rationale 
disproportionately increased to 8 observations with a 75.00% success rate.  And after Article 
2.21A’s enactment, courts found fraud or misrepresentation to be instrumental in 38 cases, with 
litigants prevailing 44.74% of the time; when an ambiguous or general reference to fraud or deceit 
was instrumental, piercing occurred in 29.63% of cases, versus 66.67% or 100.00% when specific 
evidence of fraud concerning assets or identity, respectively, was instrumental. 
230. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
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guity in addition to selection effects.231  Not only are substantive claims 
subject to discretionary selection and characterization by litigants, but their 
sources can vary across jurisdictions.  Specifically, certain kinds of Contract, 
Criminal, Fraud, and Tort claims can originate from, and even coexist in, the 
common law or statutes.232  To an extent this issue has been addressed by 
coding all types of claims connected to veil-piercing, but no attempt has been 
made here to control even basic jurisdictional differences. 
In line with the overall trend,233 the frequency of each type of 
substantive claim increased over time, with a sharp rise beginning in the 
1970s.  As in Thompson’s study, veil-piercing claims arise in Contract more 
than in any other substantive claim.234 
 
Table 7.  Veil-Piercing by Claim and Jurisdiction 
Claim n V-P Rate (%) 
Contract 1730 46.24 
Federal 408 42.65 
State 1322 47.35 
Criminal 48 66.67 
Federal 10 50.00 
State 38 71.05 
Fraud 400 61.00 
Federal 157 53.50 
State 243 65.84 
Statute 897 49.50 
Federal 383 50.65 
State 514 48.64 
Tort 377 47.75 
Federal 129 48.06 
State 248 47.58 
 
This comports with available data on nationwide filings for all types of 
claims, veil-piercing or otherwise.235  Since 1990, however, a surge in all 
 
231. See supra notes 143–51 and accompanying text. 
232. See, e.g., Egudin v. Carriage Court Condo., 528 So. 2d 1043, 1044 (La. Ct. App. 1988) 
(addressing fraud); People ex rel. Potter v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 224 N.W. 438, 438–40 (Mich. 1929) 
(addressing public utility contracts); Covelli v. Jackson, 700 N.Y.S.2d 341 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) 
(addressing negligent automotive repair); Ex parte Chambers, 898 S.W.2d 257, 258 (Tex. 1995) 
(addressing criminal contempt). 
233. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
234. Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1058 tbl.9. 
235. See supra note 160. 
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such Tort filings within federal court has resulted in their outnumbering 
Contract claims, which have been declining.236 
Civil veil-piercing claims prevail most often when couched in Fraud.  
The veil-piercing rate for Fraud exceeds that of any other type of civil sub-
stantive claim, in federal or state court as well as across all levels of courts. 
 
Table 8.  Veil-Piercing by Claim and Court 
Claim n V-P Rate (%) 
Contract 1730 46.24 
Trial 281 48.04 
Intermediate Appellate 1119 45.13 
Supreme 336 47.02 
Criminal 48 66.67 
Trial 5 60.00 
Intermediate Appellate 31 58.06 
Supreme 12 91.67 
Fraud 400 61.00 
Trial 97 57.73 
Intermediate Appellate 239 56.49 
Supreme 67 79.10 
Statute 897 49.50 
Trial 271 53.51 
Intermediate Appellate 452 46.24 
Supreme 176 51.14 
Tort 377 47.75 
Trial 91 53.85 
Intermediate Appellate 224 44.20 
Supreme 63 47.62 
 
Indeed, when Fraud is paired with another civil substantive claim, there is 
markedly more veil-piercing success than with that claim alone.237  And, 
notably, subclaims for Fraud that can be characterized as Contract, such as 
Fraudulent Misrepresentation, feature lower veil-piercing rates than their 
counterparts for Tort, such as Deceit.238 
 
 
236. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 160. 
237. See infra Table 9. 
238. See infra Table 10. 
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Table 9.  Veil-Piercing by Combinations of Claims 
Claim n V-P Rate (%) 
Contract 1393 45.37 
Criminal 1 100.00 
Fraud 77 83.12 
Statute 707 47.95 
Tort 215 44.65 
Contract-Criminal 1 100.00 
Contract-Fraud 155 57.42 
Contract-Statute 125 42.40 
Contract-Tort 44 45.45 
Criminal-Fraud 6 66.67 
Criminal-Statute 38 63.16 
Criminal-Tort 2 100.00 
Fraud-Statute 99 53.54 
Fraud-Tort 51 56.86 
Statute-Tort 53 52.83 
Contract-Fraud-Tort 12 41.67 
 
Veil-piercing claims prevail more often in Tort than Contract.  Although 
slight, the disparity also holds in federal and state courts.239  And this result is 
produced by the law in 60.78% of all jurisdictions. 
 
Figure 4.  Tort v. Contract Veil-Piercing Rates240 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
239. See infra Table 7.  The disparity also holds true for both trial and supreme courts.  See 
infra Table 8.  The results for intermediate appellate courts should be discounted, as they depend 
heavily on state cases from an incomplete database.  See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
240. Puerto Rico is the only nonstate whose rate in Tort (66.67%) exceeds Contract (50.00%). 
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The law from all the shaded states produces higher veil-piercing rates in Tort 
than Contract.  There is no apparent connection between overall laxity in 
veil-piercing and whether that jurisdiction’s law results in more success in 
Tort than Contract; the proportion of jurisdictions whose law results in 
piercing in excess of the overall rate is almost evenly divided between 
shaded and nonshaded states.241 
These results do not square with Thompson’s findings.  Over his 
original time frame the veil-piercing rate for Tort was 52.94% versus 45.90% 
for Contract.  And these disparities cannot be explained by Thompson’s 
omission of Fraud.  When the various subclaims for Fraud are recharacter-
ized as either a Contract or Tort claim,242 the gap between the veil-piercing 
rates prior to 1986 becomes even greater: 61.68% for Tort versus 47.23% for 
Contract; that gap remains over this entire dataset’s time frame: 54.34% for 
Tort versus 47.23% for Contract.243  The identity of rates in Contract across 
these time frames makes clear that veil-piercing litigants have been experi-
encing less success in Tort over the past two decades.244 
This trend in Tort is apparent even in the main dataset, where Fraud 
claims are segregated.  From 1986 up to and including 2006, veil-piercing 
claims actually prevail less in Tort, 43.48%, than Contract, 46.56%.245  One 
plausible explanation is that Thompson’s findings have altered litigation 
patterns, but only a handful of reported cases have cited the perplexing 
asymmetry, much less relied upon it, in deciding whether to pierce in 
Contract or Tort.246  Another possibility is that Thompson’s time frame 
coincides with some inflection point, but there is no discernable fork over the 
past three decades in the veil-piercing rates for Contract or Tort.  A large part 
of this puzzle may lie in Fraud, whose veil-piercing rate has decreased con-
 
241. The most interesting state in this regard is Virginia, which features an extremely low 
piercing rate and yet favors piercing in Contract over Tort.  Because of the paucity of cases, “[i]t is 
clearly more difficult in Virginia than in its neighboring jurisdictions to grasp the state’s piercing 
doctrine.”  Epperson & Canny, supra note 193, at 632. 
242. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.  Material Misrepresentation and Innocent 
Misrepresentation subclaims were recharacterized as Contract, while Common Law Fraud or Deceit 
and Negligent Misrepresentation subclaims were recharacterized as Tort; Fraudulent 
Misrepresentation and Fraudulent Transfer subclaims were equally divided into Contract and Tort.  
To be sure, this is an imprecise way to reverse engineer Thompson’s coding, particularly because of 
the presumed indifference between Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Fraudulent Transfer claims; 
recalibrating the allocation, however, seems unlikely to alter the gap, given its considerable size. 
243. For these recharacterized claims, the veil-piercing rate for Tort exceeds the rate for 
Contract in federal or state court, as well as against an individual or corporate shareholder. 
244. This is not inconsistent with Thompson’s speculation that “change in [P]roduct-[L]iability 
law and [T]ort law generally in recent decades may have led plaintiffs to bring suits that go beyond 
prior law.”  Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1069. 
245. But cf. supra Figure 4 (indicating that veil-piercing claims prevail more often in Tort than 
in Contract in the majority of jurisdictions). 
246. See Theberge v. Darbro, Inc., 684 A.2d 1298, 1303 (Me. 1996) (“The distinction between 
[C]ontract and [T]ort creditors . . . breaks down when the debtor engages in fraud or 
misrepresentation.”). 
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siderably over the past few decades.247  The reason for this decrease is not 
clear and bears further investigation.  At the very least, veil-piercing in Fraud 
does seem to correlate more strongly with that in Tort, as compared to 
Contract, and thus seems to have some distortive effect on Thompson’s 
finding. 
Moreover, veil-piercing is not rooted within inequitable bargains.248  
Comparing types of contracting parties as a proxy for relative sophistication 
reveals no appreciable difference in veil-piercing when a bargain involves 
only organizations, versus an organization with an individual.249 
 
Table 10.  Veil-Piercing by Claim and Subclaim 
Claim n V-P Rate (%) 
Contract 1730 46.24 
Individual-Organization 678 45.43 
Organization-Organization 1052 46.77 
Criminal 48 66.67 
Fraud 400 61.00 
Fraud/Deceit 111 68.47 
Fraudulent Misrepresentation 104 53.85 
Fraudulent Transfer 161 67.08 
Innocent Misrepresentation 2 0.00 
Material Misrepresentation 5 20.00 
Negligent Misrepresentation 17 17.65 
Statute 897 49.50 
Antitrust 21 42.86 
Arbitration 3 33.33 
Bankruptcy 107 49.53 
Commercial 49 61.22 
Constitution 15 33.33 
Corporation 38 44.74 
Criminal 35 68.57 
Discrimination 7 14.29 
Environmental 26 61.54 
ERISA/Social Security 33 66.67 
         (continued) 
 
 
247. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 222–27; supra Figure 3.  Certainly, another part 
of the puzzle may lie in the choice of exclusions, multiplicity of claims, and coding of cases. 
248. See infra Table 10 (indicating that the veil-piercing rates for Contract claims between 
organizations, and between individuals and organizations, are 46.77% and 45.43% respectively). 
249. To be sure, interorganizational contracting does not necessarily involve less disparate 
sophistication levels than those between organizations and individuals.  A better measure would be 
to discern the amount of financial resources, quality of business expertise and legal counsel, as well 
as the specific contract terms; even if such data could be obtained, a reliable metric would be 
difficult to formulate.  In any event, the endgame suggests no material difference. 
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Table 10 (cont.).  Veil-Piercing by Claim and Subclaim 
Claim n V-P Rate (%) 
Fraudulent Transfer 38 60.53 
Health 3 33.33 
Housing 19 36.84 
Insurance 15 40.00 
Intellectual Property 34 47.06 
Labor 48 37.50 
Licensing 28 46.43 
Liquor 16 43.75 
Marital 46 56.52 
Maritime 13 30.77 
Other 22 45.45 
Real Property 22 54.55 
Remedial 49 44.90 
Securities 19 42.11 
Tax 42 42.85 
Trust & Estate 35 42.86 
Unfair/Deceptive Trade 58 68.97 
Usury 12 41.67 
Utility 27 40.74 
Workers’ Compensation 32 46.88 
Tort 377 47.75 
Intentional Tort-Person 15 20.00 
Intentional Tort-Property 72 59.72 
Negligence 242 45.04 
Products Liability 22 36.36 
Tortious Interference w/ K 44 54.55 
 
Indeed, piercing occurs more often against interorganizational bargains not 
only overall, but also across federal and state courts, and irrespective of 
whether the controlling shareholder is an individual or a corporate parent; 
this seems to dispel any sort of judicial predisposition to utilizing veil-
piercing as an equitable shield for individual creditors from corporate 
wrongs.  This, however, may somewhat reflect that parties with potentially 
superior stakes and resources will seek an advantage, such as higher quality 
legal services; although the veil-piercing rates are quite comparable overall 
for the different types of bargains, corporate parents do enjoy a bit more 
success defending themselves against claims by an individual Contract 
creditor than by another organization.250 
 
250. Piercing occurs against corporate parents 40.91% of the time with interorganizational 
bargains versus 36.37% with individual–organization bargains.  The rates against individual 
shareholders are comparable for the different types of bargains. 
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The results for specific subclaims in Tort are mixed.  By a large margin, 
veil-piercing claims most frequently were couched in Negligence,251 but that 
veil-piercing rate was considerably lower than that for Torts against Property 
or Tortious Interference with Contract, both of which require proof of 
intent.252  The disparity in rates can be traced to the type of shareholder.  As 
with the overall dataset, Negligence claims far more often result in judicial 
reaching into the assets of individual shareholders than those of corporate 
parents.253  In contrast, when presented with an Intentional Tort against 
Property or Interference with a Contract, courts pierce with comparable 
frequency against both types of shareholders;254 one plausible explanation 
may be that requiring evidence of deliberate tortious activity quells judicial 
concern about whether a corporate parent has an interest in or control over its 
subsidiary.255 
Individual shareholders, though, remain more vulnerable than corporate 
parents for each and every substantive claim overall. 
 
Figure 5.  Veil-Piercing by Claim and Shareholder Type 
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The bars represent the overall veil-piercing rate for each type of claim, each 
of which is divided by the proportion due to piercing of corporate parents 
 
251. Cf. KEETON ET AL., supra note 136, § 105, at 725 (“A great many of the common and 
familiar forms of negligent conduct . . . are in their essence nothing more than 
misrepresentation . . . .”). 
252. The distinction is not crisp as Intentional Torts Against Person feature a paltry 20.00% 
veil-piercing rate, but that result is quite unreliable given the miniscule number of cases. 
253. Veil-piercing claims in Negligence succeed 51.88% against individuals versus 31.33% 
against corporate parents. 
254. For Torts against Property, veil-piercing claims prevail slightly more often against an 
individual (62.00%) than against an entity (54.55%); for Tortious Interference with a Contract, 
claims prevail 54.55% of the time against either type of shareholder. 
255. See supra notes 168–69 and accompanying text. 
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versus individuals; Statute and Tort claims thus feature a comparatively 
higher proportion of success against corporate parents.  In absolute terms, 
though, the veil-piercing rate against corporate parents is slightly higher in 
Contract than Tort.256   
 
Table 11.  Veil-Piercing by Claim and Shareholder Type257 
Claim n V-P Rate (%) 
Contract 1730 46.24 
Entity 458 39.96 
Person 1268 48.58 
Criminal 48 66.67 
Entity 8 50.00 
Person 40 70.00 
Fraud 400 61.00 
Entity 71 54.93 
Person 328 62.50 
Statute 897 49.50 
Entity 318 41.51 
Person 573 53.93 
Tort 377 47.75 
Entity 144 37.50 
Person 233 54.08 
 
This seems in line with economic arguments about veil-piercing generating 
potentially perverse incentives in Tort for corporate parents that can organize 
as separate ventures.258  But such arguments may be imputing too much to 
 
256. See infra Table 11. 
257. This Table omits government shareholders. 
258. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 111 (presenting a hypothetical about 
taxi firms apparently inspired by the classic enterprise liability case, Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 
N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966), in which veil-piercing would favor smaller, unaffiliated firms that have an 
incentive to carry minimal insurance: “[p]otential victims of torts would not gain from a legal rule 
that promoted corporate dis-integration”).  If this account is correct, the results are not inconsistent 
with there being a considerable number of veil-piercing claims in Tort concerning that type of 
competitive context.  But see Harvey Gelb, Limited Liability Policy and Veil Piercing, 9 WYO. L. 
REV. 551, 565–68 (2009) (arguing generally that “the perspective [that] courts in piercing the veil 
should be more hostile to [C]ontract creditors than [T]ort creditors may be fashionable in some 
quarters . . . but it is actually inappropriate,” specifically because, inter alia, “courts have been 
reluctant to pierce entity veils” and “[p]rotecting [C]ontract creditors against egregious behavior by 
withdrawing the limited liability shield . . . should be the norm and not the exception”).  Gelb’s 
arguments rely heavily on observations that are at odds with the findings here and, in any event, 
prove too much as they ultimately aim to supplant the Contract–Tort distinction with an 
amorphously broad equitable test that would generate mixed incentives and costly uncertainty. 
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courts, as evidenced by their divergence from such views with respect to 
piercing individual versus corporate shareholders.259 
Although highly frequent, Statute claims are very context dependent.  
The Statute data was divided into thirty different subtypes, which feature 
considerably variable veil-piercing rates.  The exclusions applied to cases 
involving Arbitration, Bankruptcy, Discrimination, Environmental, 
ERISA/Social Security, Labor, Tax, Trust and Estate, and Workers’ 
Compensation statutes concern substantively distinct analogies to veil-
piercing,260 and thus there are still some cases involving the classic corporate 
doctrine.  Only the claims couched in Environmental and ERISA/Social 
Security statutes feature a rate higher than the overall dataset; this may be 
due to the Environmental claims involving a disproportionate amount of cor-
porate torts, and a tendency toward construing ERISA/Social Security 
provisions liberally in favor of the beneficiary.261  Not surprisingly, the larg-
est share of Statute cases belongs to Bankruptcy, as insolvency is a natural 
complement to veil-piercing.262  Notably, Commercial and Unfair or 
Deceptive Trade statutes account for a sizable share, which may be due to 
their being an alternative to Contract claims; their veil-piercing rates, though, 
are among the highest for Statutes and considerably higher than those for 
Contract claims. 
D. Mapping the Wilderness of Judicial Reasons 
A plethora of reasons is at the disposal of courts to support their 
decision whether to pierce.  Courts may cite just the conclusory metaphorical 
aspects of the alter ego or instrumentality test.263  Alternatively, courts simply 
may recite the litany of fact-specific factors, even when the factors are 
 
259. See supra notes 169–73 and accompanying text. 
260. See supra notes 124–28, 130–32 and accompanying text. 
261. See, e.g., Leddy v. Standard Drywall, Inc., 875 F.2d 383, 388 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding an 
officer–shareholder liable for required contributions under ERISA due to ERISA’s legislative 
purpose, despite “the traditional conditions for piercing the corporate veil . . . not [being] met”); 
Lucia Ann Silecchia, Pinning the Blame & Piercing the Veil in the Mists of Metaphor: The Supreme 
Court’s New Standards for the CERCLA Liability of Parent Companies and a Proposal for 
Legislative Reform, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 115, 118 (1998) (“[C]ourts repeatedly face plaintiffs 
seeking to hold parent corporations liable for the CERCLA responsibilities of their subsidiaries.  
This has been justified primarily as an effort to cast a wide net for responsible parties and achieve 
CERCLA’s oft-touted broad remedial purposes.”). 
262. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 85, at 542 n.98 (“As is often said, a fraudulent conveyance is 
but the reflex of an insolvent man.”).  But see, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent 
Heir, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 621 n.164 (1989) (“Courts have not, however, been willing to 
pierce the corporate veil in [T]ort cases where the sole justification for doing so is involuntary 
insolvency.”). 
263. See, e.g., Mesler v. Bragg Mgmt. Co., 702 P.2d 601, 607 (Cal. 1985) (“The essence of the 
alter ego doctrine is that justice be done.  ‘What the formula comes down to, once shorn of verbiage 
about control, instrumentality, agency, and corporate entity, is that liability is imposed to reach an 
equitable result.’” (citation omitted)). 
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attenuated from the underlying harm.264  A factor’s mere mention, however, 
is not necessarily reflective of a court’s actual deliberations.  As a result, a 
simple tally of factors appearing in decisions may provide an optical illusion, 
rather than an accurate portrait, of the reasons why veil-piercing succeeds. 
This study presents two angles to the ratio decidendi of veil-piercing.  
The frequency data indicate the relative popularity of an instrumental ra-
tionale in veil-piercing decisions.  And the veil-piercing rate data indicate the 
relative value of that rationale, as its absence or presence in a case depended 
on the veil-piercing claim’s success. 
 
Table 12.  Veil-Piercing by Rationale 
Rationale n V-P Rate (%) 
Agency 152 52.63 
Alter Ego 197 62.94 
Assumption of Risk 104 3.85 
Commingling 584 61.30 
Advertising 7 71.43 
Assets 440 58.64 
Contracts 8 62.50 
Directors 115 69.57 
Employees 41 75.61 
Officers 79 72.15 
Records 29 48.28 
Retirement Plans 0 -- 
Stationery 7 71.43 
Taxes 40 50.00 
Domination 787 66.58 
Fraud/Misrepresentation 989 38.62 
Fraud/Deceit 262 27.48 
Assets 97 62.87 
Identity 129 65.12 
Informalities 354 61.30 
Meetings 124 64.52 
Records 146 67.12 
Other 156 55.77 
         (continued) 
 
 
 
 
264. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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Table 12 (cont.).  Veil-Piercing by Rationale 
Rationale n V-P Rate (%) 
Injustice/Unfairness 890 51.35 
Instrumentality 143 61.54 
Sham/Shell 286 60.14 
Siphoning of Funds 278 73.74 
Statutory Policy 251 51.39 
Undercapitalization 411 61.56 
Incorporation 42 64.29 
Post-Incorporation 376 61.97 
Other 550 33.45 
 
For instance, assumption of risk accounts for only 1.74% of the total number 
of observations for instrumental rationales, which reflects its disfavor as a 
justification; the 3.85% veil-piercing rate reflects that the rationale over-
whelmingly functions to justify a decision not to pierce. 
There are no surprises about the five most popular instrumental 
rationales.  The top three—fraud or misrepresentation, injustice or 
unfairness, and domination—all commonly appear in veil-piercing tests, and 
are among the most compelling rationales within academic and practical 
commentary.265  Similarly, there has been a durable belief about the rele-
vance of commingling and undercapitalization to veil-piercing.266 
All of these rationales also are the most popular in veil-piercing claims 
grounded in Contract, Fraud, or Tort. 
 
 
265. See PRESSER, supra note 1, § 1:6, at 1-31 (“It was not enough, then, for Powell, for the 
subsidiary to be utterly dominated by the parent.  In addition, there must be some ‘injustice’ 
perpetrated . . . .”); Rutheford B. Campbell, Limited Liability for Corporate Shareholders: Myth or 
Matter-of-Fact, 63 KY. L.J. 23, 37–39 (1975) (“[S]ome element of control seems indispensable to 
the disregard of the corporate entity.”); Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1045 n.58, 
1063 tbl.11, 1066 (reporting both domination and misrepresentation to be among the most 
frequently mentioned rationales, while reporting unfairness to be a commonly mentioned rationale 
that does not, however, rank among the top five); supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
266. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 216, at 985 (“The [Texas] courts often stress two factors—
inadequate capitalization and the commingling of shareholder and corporate affairs—when 
determining whether shareholders should be held responsible for claims against their corporation.”). 
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Figure 6.  Frequency of Rationales for Certain Claims 
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This figure depicts how frequently a rationale was instrumental as a 
percentage of each claim’s total number of rationale observations.  The 
proportions for all these rationales are strikingly similar in Tort and 
Contract.267  This is most surprising with respect to undercapitalization,268 
which some believe to be far more relevant in Tort than Contract.269 
 
 
267. See infra Table 13. 
268. Cf. Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1066 (“In both contexts [(Contract 
and Tort)] courts refused to pierce in 25 to 30% of the cases even when undercapitalization was 
present . . . .”). 
269. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. 1, 44 
n.123 (1986) (“An undercapitalization requirement may make good sense in some nontort, 
contractual settings.”); supra notes 28, 107 and accompanying text. 
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Table 13.  Veil-Piercing by Rationale and Claim 
Rationale Contract Criminal Fraud Statute       Tort 
Agency 49.48 100.00 36.36 52.94 40.91 
Alter Ego 61.11 50.00 71.88 62.32 67.86 
Assumption of Risk 3.16 100.00 0.00 10.00 0.00 
Commingling 56.15 100.00 65.15 65.27 65.85 
Domination 66.81 89.47 70.30 70.17 54.87 
Fraud/Misrep. 34.75 83.33 67.76 38.55 40.95 
Informalities 61.92 0.00 69.44 56.47 56.25 
Injustice/Unfairness 50.71 87.50 67.01 49.20 54.95 
Instrumentality 60.26 100.00 73.33 61.11 61.90 
Sham/Shell 60.57 75.00 75.00 60.56 46.51 
Siphoning of Funds 69.84 75.00 74.29 77.97 75.86 
Statutory Policy 44.83 47.06 60.00 51.41 40.00 
Undercapitalization 61.79 0.00 61.02 59.55 60.78 
Other 33.53 18.18 47.62 30.99 29.55 
 
Evidence of fraud or misrepresentation is the most popular rationale 
overall.  The rationale is instrumental with comparable frequency in Contract 
and Tort, in line with commentary.270  But the rationale is instrumental in 
only 45.75% of cases involving Fraud, which may be due to courts focusing 
on the claim rather than the evidence to justify veil-piercing.271 
Popularity is not everything, however, and some of the less frequent 
instrumental rationales merit attention.  Despite their conclusory nature, alter 
ego and instrumentality do not appear with much frequency overall.272  And 
agency does not rank highly among the rationales, despite being a doctrinal 
precursor to veil-piercing and receiving considerable attention as a potential 
substitute for at least Contract claims;273 the rationale seems to be compara-
bly relevant to both Contract and Tort.  In contrast courts not surprisingly 
cite assumption of risk far more often in Contract than Tort. 
The mean veil-piercing rate for all observations of instrumental 
rationales is 53.16%.274  Fraud or misrepresentation features among the 
 
270. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
271. Cf., e.g., Krendl & Krendl, supra note 12, at 31 (“Clearly, if the plaintiff . . . had a good 
fraud claim he would plead it . . . .”). 
272. See, e.g., HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 136, at 312 
(rev. ed. 1946) (“All corporations are used as business instrumentalities.”). 
273. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 216, at 983–94 (“[N]o conceptual problems emerge when 
liability is imposed upon shareholders under conventional theories of [A]gency or [T]ort law.”).  
But see, e.g., Millon, supra note 16, at 1331 (“If the courts . . . are serious about a finding of agency, 
there is no need to consider veil piercing at all.”); infra note 290. 
274. This varies from the overall veil-piercing rate of 48.51% due to the increased number of 
observations. 
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lowest rates, which seems to indicate that the rationale asserts itself most 
strongly in decisions not to pierce.  But the particularized results tell a differ-
ent story.  Ambiguous or general references to the rationale result in piercing 
only 27.48% of the time; in contrast, specific evidence of fraud or misrepre-
sentation as to assets or identity justifies piercing, respectively, 62.87% or 
65.12% of the time.275  These results indicate that, whether the jurisdiction’s 
test explicitly requires proof, fraud or misrepresentation is a significant con-
sideration for courts; its general absence is highly instrumental in deciding 
not to pierce, while specific evidence translates into superior odds for 
successful veil-piercing. 
Even more fascinating, though, is what happens when evidence of fraud 
or misrepresentation is not instrumental.  In such cases there is essentially a 
substitution effect: the veil-piercing rates for the other most instrumental ra-
tionales all increase. 
 
Figure 7.  Veil-Piercing Rates for Rationales  
in Relation to Fraud/Misrepresentation 
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The effect is most pronounced for injustice or unfairness, where the veil-
piercing rate leaps to 64.27% when the cases also citing fraud or misrepre-
sentation are excluded.  And this effect is far stronger for all of the most 
popular rationales within state courts, particularly in the case of domination 
(70.81%) and undercapitalization (68.82%).  These results circumstantially 
suggest that when instrumental, evidence of fraud or misrepresentation as-
serts itself more strongly than other prominent rationales, even though its 
presence alone tends to justify veil-piercing. 
 
275. This pattern applies to claims in both Contract and Tort. 
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The results for undercapitalization are also illuminating.  On the one 
hand, the relatively high veil-piercing rate indicates that the rationale tends to 
assert itself more strongly when courts decide to pierce;276 this comports with 
widely held beliefs about undercapitalization’s relevance and utility.277  On 
the other hand, the rate is virtually uniform across veil-piercing claims in 
Contract, Tort, and Fraud, which may be surprising to some commentators.278  
Regardless, courts appear to have adjusted their use of the rationale appropri-
ately to reflect the change in capitalization requirements, as attention over 
time has shifted from the initial point of incorporation to working amounts, 
which are now cited far more frequently.  This shift conceptually comple-
ments another prominent rationale, siphoning of funds.  And like 
undercapitalization, evidence of a corporation’s accounts being pillaged for a 
shareholder’s benefit is very instrumental in decisions to pierce for all types 
of substantive claims. 
For the most part, however, the instrumental value of rationales does 
vary based on the type of substantive claim.  When fraud or misrepresenta-
tion concerning a corporation’s assets was instrumental in a Tort case, 
piercing occurred 90.91% of the time, by far the strongest rationale for any 
civil claim; yet fraud or misrepresentation about a shareholder’s identity re-
sulted in piercing only 60.00% of the time.  Further, this sharp disparity in 
veil-piercing rates did not appear in either Contract or Fraud;279 although the 
number of observations in Tort is quite small, the results may reflect a 
distinction in the kinds of fraud or misrepresentation that are most likely to 
occur within that context. 
The emphasis on assets within Tort is manifest in its other instrumental 
rationales.  In addition to siphoning of funds and undercapitalization,280 evi-
dence of commingling resulted in a high rate of veil-piercing.  These results 
contrast with Contract, where commingling is fairly neutral; instead, evi-
dence of domination and a failure to observe formalities were highly 
instrumental to a decision to pierce within the bargaining context.281  For 
both Tort and Contract claims, though, veil-piercing claims experience com-
parably low rates of success when the plaintiff is found to have assumed risk 
or there is an absence of general evidence of fraud or misrepresentation. 
 
276. But cf. Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1063 tbl.11 (reporting that the 
presence of undercapitalization is correlated with decisions to pierce 73.33% of the time, which is 
substantially less than numerous other rationales). 
277. See supra notes 28, 101–06 and accompanying text. 
278. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text.  Cf. Thompson, Empirical Piercing, 
supra note 20, at 1066 (finding undercapitalization present in only 18.65% of 327 Contract cases 
where piercing occurred, versus 12.86% of 70 Tort cases). 
279. In Contract, the veil-piercing rates were 63.38% for assets and 62.86% for shareholder; in 
Fraud, the rates were 81.82% for assets and 82.61% for shareholder. 
280. See supra notes 274–76 and accompanying text. 
281. Different types of bargains yielded similar veil-piercing rates for domination, but when 
there was a failure to observe formalities, the veil-piercing for bargains between individuals and 
organizations (70.93%) was considerably higher than that between organizations (56.86%). 
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Fraud claims feature the most distinct group of instrumental rationales.  
Aside from siphoning of funds as well as specific evidence of fraud or 
misrepresentation, courts that decide to pierce predominantly resort to 
conclusory metaphors, such as evidence of a defendant corporation being the 
sham or shell, mere instrumentality, or alter ego of a controlling 
shareholder.282  Such metaphors, along with domination, are common 
elements of most veil-piercing tests; accordingly, the results indicate that liti-
gants capable of proving their Fraud claim already may have surpassed the 
evidentiary threshold for seeking relief from a controlling shareholder.283 
The results collectively suggest that different claims do indeed represent 
distinct settings for veil-piercing.284  Litigants that seek relief in Contract 
experience relatively more success upon proffering a set of evidence: 
excessive control, as manifest in domination or a failure to observe corporate 
formalities, that has resulted in a financially depleted corporation whose ul-
timate risk has been distorted by some kind of fraud or misrepresentation.  In 
contrast, litigants in Tort enjoy superior odds when marshaling evidence 
about financial misconduct, with courts apparently recognizing that the ele-
ment of control may be less relevant in such contexts.285  And when litigants 
can meet the requirements for Fraud, they already have gone a considerable 
way toward demonstrating a case for veil-piercing.  At their core, though, all 
substantive claims seem to be more compelling when supported by evidence 
that the corporation’s inability to satisfy a judgment is due to some kind of 
asset-related abuse or malfeasance.  Such evidence seems far more 
instrumental in decisions to pierce than injustice or unfairness, despite the 
latter’s resilient popularity. 
E. Staking Out the Voluntary–Involuntary Debate 
The distinction between voluntary and involuntary creditors may strike 
some as an “argument from convenience.”286  There is a compelling intuition 
 
282. Arguably, sham or shell may be a substitute for fraud or misrepresentation.  See, e.g., 
WORMSER, supra note 4, at 59 (“Where a corporation is organized as a mere sham . . . courts, even 
without regard to actual fraud, are wont to disregard the entity theory.”). 
283. See supra note 269 and accompanying text. 
284. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
285. See, e.g., Krendl & Krendl, supra note 12, at 6 (“The plaintiff may be . . . a tort victim who 
had no knowledge of the defendant prior to the incident giving rise to his claim.”). 
286. See PRESSER, supra note 1, § 1:7, at 1-34 to 1-35 (“I have called [economic analysis of 
limited liability] the ‘argument from convenience’ in order to invoke Holmes’s theory that the law 
at any given time corresponds closely with what is then regarded as ‘convenient.’”); OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (Little, Brown & Co. reprint) (Mark D. Howe ed., 
Harv. Univ. Press 1963) (1st ed. 1881) (“The substance of the law at any given time pretty nearly 
corresponds . . . with what is then understood to be convenient; but its form and machinery, and the 
degree to which it is able to work out desired results, depend very much upon its past.”).  Although 
Presser’s comment is directed to orthodox economic treatments of limited liability, this may be 
construed more specifically about the economic recasting of the Contract–Tort distinction into one 
between voluntary and involuntary creditors.  Robert Clark, for instance, dismisses Richard 
Posner’s analysis of veil-piercing as merely complementary: 
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behind enforcing transactions against creditors that have had an ex ante op-
portunity to assess, bargain, and insure themselves against risk, versus those 
that have not.287  While that intuition is commonly articulated for veil-
piercing in economic terms, its roots actually lie in traditional doctrinal 
analysis.288  Nevertheless, a few courts apparently refuse to adhere to this 
distinction,289 which simply makes clear that part of its utility may be 
normative. 
Less clear, though, are the lines demarcating Contract, Fraud, and 
Tort.290  While the asymmetry between Contract and Tort runs throughout the 
veil-piercing jurisprudence and literature, the distinction may be conceptually 
misdrawn.  Reexamining veil-piercing cases in terms of voluntary or invol-
untary creditors affords an alternative perspective that ultimately may 
confirm whether courts indeed perceive differences between civil bargains 
and wrongs, and adjudicate them appropriately. 
This dataset’s coding of specific subclaims provides a unique 
opportunity to analyze the creditor distinction.  Accordingly, all of the results 
were recast.  Voluntary creditors comprise all veil-piercing claims in 
Contract, Material Misrepresentation, Innocent Misrepresentation, and 
Tortious Interference with Contract; all veil-piercing claims in Intentional 
Tort (with Person or Property), Negligence, Strict Liability, Common Law 
Fraud or Deceit, and Negligent Misrepresentation comprise involuntary 
 
Richard Posner’s recent article on veil-piercing . . . seems to me . . . to constitute an 
elaboration and justification, in terms of microeconomic theory, of what I call the 
standard initial response to the problem. . . .  In general, though I find Posner’s analysis 
complementary rather than objectionable . . . and [do] not adopt[] his 
emphasis . . . [because] his elaborate arguments seem to me to be directed towards 
propositions which, in their essence, have been accepted by judges for decades. 
Clark, supra note 85, at 542 n.98; cf. Presser, supra note 59, at 157 (“Posner did not rely to any 
significant extent on the historical purposes of the doctrine to support his analysis, which appears to 
have been implicitly based on the conditions of the modern credit market.”).  These misgivings 
seem to discount the efficiency of the common law hypothesis.  See generally R. H. Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
287. See, e.g., Barbara H. Fried, Ex Ante/Ex Post, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 123, 123 
(2003) (“No principle of ethics requires that Monte Carlo produce only winners.” (quoting J. Mark 
Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the Protection Racket: A Reply to Professors 
Graetz and Kaplow, 75 VA. L. REV. 1155, 1160 (1989))). 
288. See, e.g., BALLANTINE, supra note 270, § 137, at 315 (“A voluntary [C]ontract creditor 
stands in a somewhat different position from the involuntary [T]ort creditor.”); id. § 137, at 315–18 
(illustrating how, but for “intermeddling . . . in the affairs” of the subsidiary by the parent, or other 
“special circumstances,” courts will not hold the parent liable on contracts of the subsidiary); 
LATTY, supra note 101, § 49, at 201 (“To make the classification [between Tort and Contract 
creditors] more significant, the line of distinction should perhaps be drawn between involuntary and 
voluntary creditors.”); id. § 49, at 201–05 (exploring the intuition behind more strictly limiting the 
liability of a parent company for claims against its subsidiaries in Contract than in Tort). 
289. See, e.g., Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 22 F.3d 1228, 1240 n.20 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(“In some states, . . . piercing the corporate veil and alter ego actions are allowed to prevent unjust 
or inequitable results; they are not based solely on a policy of protecting creditors.”). 
290. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 136, § 92, at 655 (“The distinction between [T]ort 
and [C]ontract liability . . . has become an increasingly difficult distinction to make.”). 
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creditors.  Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Fraudulent Transfer claims were 
divided equally between voluntary and involuntary creditors. 
The results evince that veil-piercing claims prevail more often when 
they concern an involuntary (52.83%) versus a voluntary (47.50%) creditor.  
Although almost three times as frequent as their involuntary counterparts, 
voluntary-creditor claims thus virtually mirror the veil-piercing overall rate 
of 48.51% for the entire dataset. 
 
Table 14.  Veil-Piercing by Creditor and Jurisdiction 
Corporation n V-P Rate (%) 
Voluntary 1933.5 47.50 
Federal 492 44.41 
State 1441.5 48.56 
Involuntary 627.5 52.83 
Federal 216 51.16 
State 411.5 53.71 
 
And the disparity in veil-piercing rates for voluntary and involuntary 
creditors is greater than that for Contract and Tort. 
 
Figure 8.  Creditors v. Claims Veil-Piercing Rates 
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As with Tort, involuntary-creditor claims present a considerably greater risk 
of veil-piercing for individual shareholders than corporate parents. 
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Table 15.  Veil-Piercing by Creditor and Shareholder Type 
Claim n V-P Rate (%) 
Voluntary 1933.5 47.50 
Entity 511.5 41.35 
Person 1420 49.82 
Involuntary 627.5 52.83 
Entity 171.5 41.45 
Person 456 57.22 
These results collectively suggest that courts may conceptualize veil-piercing 
as best suited to prevent a wrong from individual shareholders who external-
ize unforeseeable risk.  Incidentally, this conception is compatible with the 
judicial view that corporate parents tend not to be shareholders in the classic 
sense.291 
The five most popular instrumental rationales for Contract and Tort 
remain so in voluntary and involuntary creditor cases: fraud or 
misrepresentation, injustice or unfairness, domination, commingling, and 
undercapitalization. 
Table 16.  Veil-Piercing by Rationale and Creditor 
Rationale n V-P Rate (%) 
Agency 132 47.73 
Voluntary 106 49.06 
Involuntary 26 42.31 
Alter Ego 172 61.05 
Voluntary 125 58.00 
Involuntary 47 69.15 
Assumption of Risk 104 2.88 
Voluntary 98.5 3.05 
Involuntary 5.5 0.00 
Commingling 512 58.79 
Voluntary 391.5 56.19 
Involuntary 120.5 67.23 
Domination 697 65.57 
Voluntary 518 66.70 
Involuntary 179 62.29 
         (continued) 
 
291. See BLUMBERG, supra note 168, at xl (asserting that the advantages of limited liability are 
mostly “irrelevant” in the context of corporate parents); Strasser, supra note 169, at 638 (noting that 
“different policy issues” are presented by parent companies, and thus “their limited liability should 
be determined by a different analysis”). 
2010] Veil-Piercing 143 
 
 
Table 16 (cont.).  Veil-Piercing by Rationale and Creditor 
Rationale n V-P Rate (%) 
Fraud/Misrepresentation 952 42.75 
Voluntary 716.5 38.38 
Involuntary 235.5 56.05 
Informalities 333 61.56 
Voluntary 257.5 62.52 
Involuntary 75.5 58.28 
Injustice/Unfairness 780 53.85 
Voluntary 611.5 51.76 
Involuntary 168.5 61.32 
Instrumentality 116 62.93 
Voluntary 86.5 60.12 
Involuntary 29.5 71.19 
Sham/Shell 265 60.75 
Voluntary 198 62.12 
Involuntary 67 56.72 
Siphoning of Funds 260 70.38 
Voluntary 206 69.90 
Involuntary 54 72.22 
Statutory Policy 61 49.18 
Voluntary 38.5 48.05 
Involuntary 22.5 51.11 
Undercapitalization 406 63.05 
Voluntary 308.5 62.88 
Involuntary 97.5 63.59 
Other 513 35.09 
Voluntary 379.5 35.44 
Involuntary 133.5 34.08 
And as with the overall dataset, the relative proportion of these rationales 
remains roughly the same for both types of creditors.  Although not among 
the more popular rationales, agency is instrumental in both types of cases 
with comparable frequency; this is somewhat surprising in light of the con-
sensual nature of such relationships that also tend to exist in the voluntary-
creditor context.292  That dynamic is most apparent in assumption of risk, 
whose palpable presence in voluntary-creditor cases becomes almost nonex-
istent in the involuntary context. 
 
292. But see, e.g., Krendl & Krendl, supra note 12, at 3 n.9 (embracing Learned Hand’s 
position about the limits of agency principles for veil-piercing purposes: “express agency would not 
provide a remedy because the consensual element would be lacking and . . . implied agency would 
be inappropriate because that would mean the veil would be pierced in every situation”). 
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The differences are broader and sharper with respect to the veil-piercing 
rates.  Both injustice or unfairness and commingling assert themselves far 
more strongly when courts decide in favor of involuntary creditors; this is 
also true for the conclusory metaphors of alter ego and instrumentality, sim-
ilar to claims in Fraud.293  Conversely, domination and a failure to observe 
formalities mirror their strength in Contract with decisions to pierce.294  
These results tend to reinforce that Tort and Fraud present relatively compa-
rable scenarios with respect to judicial reasoning, as distinguished from 
Contract. 
The greatest disparity, though, concerns evidence of fraud or 
misrepresentation.  On the one hand, with respect to voluntary creditors, the 
rationale exhibits the same split as the overall dataset; ambiguous or general 
evidence of fraud is instrumental in decisions not to pierce, in contrast to 
specific evidence concerning assets or identity.  On the other hand, with re-
spect to involuntary creditors, the rationale is fairly neutral in a court’s 
decision to pierce; this is because the most common type of evidence of fraud 
or misrepresentation is ambiguous or general evidence and is instrumental in 
46.20% of cases that result in piercing.  These results collectively provide 
some support for arguments that fraud or misrepresentation presents a com-
pelling exception to ex ante bargaining and insurance, yet a broad-based 
justification for ex post compensation.295  And the evidence is particularly 
noteworthy in light of the fact that very few jurisdictions require proof of 
fraud or misrepresentation specifically for voluntary-creditor claims.296 
Conclusion 
Some pieces to the veil-piercing puzzle now appear to be in place, as the 
findings here and from Thompson’s study cohere in numerous ways.  The 
presumption in favor of corporate separateness is hardly axiomatic, with veil-
piercing claims prevailing over 40% of the time and with virtually equal suc-
cess in federal and state courts.297  Further, all courts will disregard the form 
of only close corporations298 and reach into the assets of individual 
shareholders far more often than those of corporate parents;299 both of these 
dynamics merit additional investigation into the specifics of corporate groups 
 
293. See supra note 280 and accompanying text. 
294. See supra note 279 and accompanying text. 
295. Interestingly, this asymmetry does not obtain for siphoning of funds or undercapitalization.  
Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 19, at 517–26 (proposing a regime of direct liability predicated on fraud 
or misrepresentation, siphoning of funds, or undercapitalization). 
296. Notable exceptions to this can be found in Texas and federal common law.  See Subway 
Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Sims (In re Sims), 994 F.2d 210, 218 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Although a finding 
of fraud is not essential in [T]ort cases, ‘in [C]ontract cases, fraud is an essential element of an alter 
ego finding.’” (citation omitted)); supra note 35. 
297. See supra notes 157, 174–80 and accompanying text. 
298. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
299. See supra notes 166–72 and accompanying text. 
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to determine the composition of those shareholders and the ways in which 
they influence how veil-piercing claims are litigated and adjudicated.  Also 
worth exploring are the reasons why veil-piercing continues to be grounded 
overwhelmingly within Contract,300 which may require a more complete 
understanding about the litigation patterns and settlement rates for different 
substantive claims.301 
But this study’s findings do reveal that some empirics of veil-piercing 
need revision.  The results affirm the central role that Fraud, as an instru-
mental rationale and as a substantive claim, must occupy within any account 
of veil-piercing; indeed, the extent to which the doctrine is permeated by 
Fraud is manifest, even in its absence as a rationale, by spurring a substitu-
tion effect with other prominent factors or as a claim by expanding the 
disparity in litigant success in Tort over Contract.302  And the results realign 
the theory and practice of veil-piercing with respect to distinct types of 
creditors; courts find veil-piercing more compelling when faced with 
creditors in Tort or of the involuntary sort, particularly when the ultimate 
shareholder is an individual or there is evidence of financial misconduct.303  
In contrast, creditors in Contract or of the voluntary sort seem to face a fairly 
neutral setting for veil-piercing; courts apparently do not impute any special 
regard to the relative sophistication of bargaining parties or the type of 
shareholder, with litigants experiencing fairly stable rates of success over the 
past three decades.304  If a story is to be constructed from the data, it may be 
that, with respect to veil-piercing, the comparison between Contract and Tort 
is less valuable than Contract serving as a reference point for the relationship 
between Tort and Fraud. 
Nevertheless, we remain hostage to a mangled and muzzy doctrine.  The 
lack of consistency within the collective results reinforces that veil-piercing 
would benefit from principled simplification, and if such options already 
exist, from disciplined judicial attention.  Some of the doctrine’s most 
vigorous criticisms have come from courts, which have condemned the use 
of metaphors, denigrated the attenuated multifactor approach, and bemoaned 
the confusing landscape of past decisions.  Yet these problems were high-
lighted by I. Maurice Wormser’s elegant synopsis almost a century ago and 
detailed by Robert Thompson’s empirical study almost two decades ago.  
The results presented here afford us with an opportunity to engage in a rein-
vigorated debate that ultimately may produce a doctrine that truly befits the 
title of Our Lady of the Common Law. 
 
300. See supra note 233 and accompanying text. 
301. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
302. See supra Figure 7. 
303. See supra notes 277–78 and accompanying text. 
304. See supra notes 242–49 and accompanying text. 
